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PERSECUTION AND LABOR MIGRATIONS DUE TO CORPORATE
“ENVIRONMENTAL” EXPLOITATION: WAITING FOR THE
UNHRC’S BINDING TREATY ON TRANSNATIONAL
BUSINESS ACTIVITIES?
Riccardo Vecellio Segate*
Abstract
Policy debates on the rights and international status of climate refugees, environmental migrants, or environmentally displaced persons have unleashed detailed scholarly commentaries over the last decade, and virtually all standpoints
have been scrutinized in literature already. Nevertheless, one aspect of this debate has gone somewhat off the radar in recent years: the (co-)responsibilities of
incorporated subsidiaries of transnational corporations in triggering or exacerbating pseudo-environmentally motivated mass-movements of workers and related
strata of the populations domiciled where these corporations operate. Despite
such neglect, mentioned exploitative occurrences only increased in recent years,
and the trend speaks for their further expansion as globalization complexifies,
world population increases, and climate disruption worsens. Against this backdrop of urgency, it seems essential to rediscover this angle of the debate; that is,
to revitalize ethical and legal discourses on private actors and what intervention
should be required of the international community in order for transnational corporations to take action and observe minimal standards of environmental good
practice, especially in corporate policy areas bearing a direct impact on labor
conditions, social development, and ultimately on the pulling or restraining factors of migration. The first international binding Treaty on business and human
rights, currently being negotiated in Geneva within the United Nations Human
Rights Council and apparently close to finalization, builds exactly on these concerns. In each of its 2018 Zero Draft, 2019 Revised Draft, 2020 Second Revised
Draft, and 2021 Third Revised Draft, the Treaty provides protection to those
workers and their families who are factually deprived of their lands due to corporate soil exploitation. In this sense, the problem will manifest itself under the new
(yet not so new) terms of distinguishing between migrations fully caused or sim*
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ply catalyzed or facilitated by localized environmental pollution and/or largescale climate-change-related phenomena. Pursuant to this new covenant, States
would be compelled to ensure that companies operating within their prescriptive
jurisdiction respect all human rights. Eventually, while this Treaty should generally be welcomed as it sheds new light on business-caused environmental migrations and it decompartmentalizes related human rights, its current formulation
might not significantly contribute to the clarification of certain definitions. Most
perplexingly, it does not establish a straightforward legal distinction between environmental migrations induced or ‘simply’ precipitated by corporate
misconduct.
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Corporate Misconduct, the Environment, and Migration1

The skeptics [. . .] raise questions about the models used to generate estimates
of those who will be forced to migrate and emphasize that pull factors in destination locations are often more important than push factors at home in determining
whether, where, and in what volume people will migrate.2
Despite widespread skepticism vis-à-vis scientific models (which seems to be,
in itself, a sign of our times), it is worth reiterating that all over the world, not
only in ‘developing’ countries,3 lands are under threat due to massive pollution
caused by the negligent or purposely criminal behavior of transnational corporations (TNCs).4 These corporations are exploiting natural resources, within the
1 The reader is advised that the law and doctrines reported in the present article were last updated on
and are thus accurate on September 23, 2021; this date precedes the seventh negotiating session towards
the adoption of the Treaty under scrutiny, expected to be held in October 2021. A much earlier version of
the present article was presented at the Environmentally-Induced Migration and Human Rights’
Protection Conference organized by the Italian Society of International Law at Sapienza University of
Rome on November 5, 2018; I would like to thank all participants for their insights. Comments are most
welcome and can be addressed to r.vecelliosegate@connect.um.edu.mo. I am the only one responsible
for any inaccuracy or omission. No conflicts of interests shall be disclosed, nor have I received any
funding for accomplishing this publication.
2 ‘Push factors’ are the reasons why individuals decide or are forced to move (i.e., to migrate or seek
refuge), including environmental factors favored by climate migration or adaptation that may draw migrants from a place to another, as distinguished from ‘pull factors’ which are the reasons why a certain
jurisdiction is more appealing over others as an intended (though not necessarily actual) destination for
those individuals. See, e.g., David James Cantor, Environment, Mobility, and International Law: A New
Approach in the Americas, 21 CHI. J. OF INT’L L., 263, 289 (2021); Susan Martin, Climate Change,
Migration, and Governance, 16 GLOB. GOVERNANCE 397, 397 (2010).
3 See, e.g., DAMIEN SHORT, REDEFINING GENOCIDE: SETTLER COLONIALISM, SOCIAL DEATH
ECOCIDE, 59-66 (Bloomsbury Publ’g 2016).

AND

4 Because the draft Treaty being discussed in this essay employs the term transnational, I will
adhere to the same terminology and refer to transnational corporations (TNCs); however, some direct
quotes from academic sources and other legal and policy instruments mention multinational corporations
(MNCs) instead and have been left unaltered. Indeed, there is no clear definition of either in scholarly
literature; it is commonly claimed that TNCs display a less centralized management structure compared
to MNCs, but these distinctions find no actual consistency in legal texts (neither regionally nor globally),
nor do they bear any operative relevance in business transactions and corporate structuring. See, e.g.,
Benedict Semple Wray, Translating Torts: A Justice Framework for Transnational Corporate Harm, 1833 (Sept. 26, 2015) (Ph.D. Thesis in Law, European University Institute) (available at http://dianan.iue.it:8080/bitstream/handle/1814/37582/2015_Wray.pdf?sequence=1&isAllowed=Y).
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context of corrupted state complicity,5 as well as international deregulation worsened by privatized power-politics.6 Trapped in the vicious circle of regulatory
capture, governments at the periphery of globalized markets’ wealth transfers7
subserviently withdraw their preferences over agricultural oversight and administration and instead favor lawless liberalization,8 aggressive mercantilism,9 and
uncontrolled urbanization.10 The cost of companies’ environmental footprint include “land use, greenhouse gas emission, water consumption and air pollution,”11 as well as “illegal wildlife trade, forestry crimes, fishery crimes, [. . .]
and trafficking in waste.”12 The degradation, privatization, and ‘outsourcing’ of
already impoverished and low-productive terrains and territories leaves populations living or therein (or relying thereon) with no choice but migration, adding
5 See, e.g., Fiona Downs, U4, Rule of Law and Environmental Justice in the Forests: The Challenge
of “Strong Law Enforcement” in Corrupt Conditions, CHR. MICHELSEN INSTITUTE 1, 1, 19-20 (June
2013).
6 Richard Black, Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality? 10 (UNHCR New Issues in Refugee
Research, Working Paper No. 34, 2001) (In Mozambique, for example, “pressure of population on resources has probably occurred, stimulated not by high population densities per se, but by granting of land
concessions to private companies.”).
7 For a ‘developed-world’ example instead, see Stephanie M. Stern, State Action as Political Voice
in Climate Change Policy: A Case Study of the Minnesota Environmental Cost Valuation Regulation, in
ADJUDICATING CLIMATE CHANGE: STATE, NATIONAL, & INT’L APPROACHES 31, 40 (William C. G. Burns
& Hari M. Osofsky eds., 2009). In my passage, the term ‘periphery’ drew conceptually on the WorldSystems Theory, classifying geo-economic regions into core, semi-peripheral, and peripheral. See, e.g.,
Arlene B. Tickner, Core, Periphery and (Neo)Imperialist International Relations, 19 EUR. J. INT’L RELATIONS 627 (2013); John A. Agnew, The Origins of Critical Geopolitics, in THE ASHGATE RESEARCH
COMPANION TO CRITICAL GEOPOLITICS 19, 22 (Klaus Dodds et al. eds., 2016).
8 See, e.g., in the case of Senegal: Kaushalya Ramachandran & Padmaja Susarla, Environmental
Migration from Rainfed Regions in India Forced by Poor Returns from Watershed Development
Projects, in ENVIRONMENT, FORCED MIGRATION & SOCIAL VULNERABILITY, 117, 127-129 (Tamer Afifi et
al. eds., 2010); Frauke Bleibaum, Case Study Senegal: Environmental Degradation and Forced Migration, in ENVIRONMENT, FORCED MIGRATION & SOCIAL VULNERABILITY 187, 188 (Tamer Afifi et al. eds.,
2010).
9 EUR. PARL. ASS., Environmentally Induced Migration and Displacement: A 21st Century Challenge, ¶ 15, Doc. No. 11785, (Dec. 23, 2008) https://pace.coe.int/pdf/759bfc82dd33b3effaa28efe
0afd493ebd94d18a8f46a31d9ea927bd01533c0f/doc.%2011785.pdf (“An additional responsibility for inducing environmental migration lies on the [W]estern world and its trade policies in terms of agricultural
export subsidies and import restrictions, which are undermining the livelihood of small hold farmers in
marginalised regions. Also, the European and American agribusinesses and their policies, such as the
patenting of genetically modified seeds, are destroying local livelihoods without providing sustainable
local returns.”).
10 See Rabab Fatima et al., Human Rights, Climate Change, Environmental Degradation and Migration: A New Paradigm, 8, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. 1, 7 (2014) (available at https://www.migrationpolicy.org/research/human-rights-climate-change-environmental-degradation-and-migration-new-paradigm).
Corporations can be said to force urbanisation and redesign the ‘geography of labour’ not only macroscopically, but on the local scale as well; they do so, for instance, by polluting, impoverishing, and/or
expropriating farmers’ terrains, or by compelling the abandonment thereof. See also Benoı̂t Mayer, Climate Migration and the Politics of Causal Attribution: A Case Study in Mongolia, 5 MIGRATION & DEV.
234, 245 (2016).
11 Ephraim Nkonya et al., Global Cost of Land Degradation, in ECONOMICS OF LAND DEGRADATION
& IMPROVEMENT – A GLOBAL ASSESSMENT FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 117, 121 (Ephraim Nkonya
et al. eds., 2016).
12 U.N. Environment Programme, The State of Knowledge of Crimes that Have Serious Impacts on
the Environment, IX (Jul. 11, 2018), https://www.unenvironment.org/resources/publication/state-knowledge-crimes-have-serious-impacts-environment.
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to both internal displacement and cross-border migratory movements. Therefore,
this cannot be simplistically framed as a problem of ‘environmental’ migration:13
[C]limate change alone does not displace people, it exacerbates social
vulnerability which contributes to displacement. While addressing environmental displacement as a refugee crisis creates a sense of urgency, this
framework will not adequately address the problem. Climate change is
not the sole source of persecution that leads people to environmental displacement. In fact it is not a source of persecution at all because it does
not discriminate. The impacts of climate change may be the reason for
why people evacuate, but they alone do not explain why people do not
return to their places of origin. [. . . S]ocioeconomic inequality and
marginalization of vulnerable communities account for the disparity in
who is displaced by the effects of climate change.14

Among them are the poorest workers (and their families) who face the direst
consequences of their or other companies’ environmentally destructive and socially degrading policies.
In international law, “[w]hereas the rights of refugees are explicit, the rights of
[internally displaced persons (IDPs) and other economic migrants] are mostly
implied from the fact that they are human beings and citizens or habitual residents of a State.”15 In fact, the concept of ‘environmental refugees’ represents a
somewhat misleading expression that does not (yet) appear in international treaty
or customary law.16 Against this background, something might well improve in
the relatively short run. Following a number of ‘soft’17 or ‘semi-soft’18 standards,
all promulgated (the former) or last revised (the latter) in 2011, since 2014 the
United Nations (UN) Human Rights Council (HRC) has been laboriously negotiating a binding human rights Treaty addressed to TNCs (hereinafter, the
13 Such a simplistic approach is perpetuated in otherwise excellent analyses, see, e.g., Michael
Berlemann & Max Friedrich Steinhardt, Climate Change, Natural Disasters, and Migration—A Survey of
the Empirical Evidence, 63 CESIFO ECONOMIC STUDIES 353 (2017).
14

Shweta Jayawardhan, Vulnerability and Climate Change Induced Human Displacement, 17 CONJ. SUSTAINABLE DEV., no. 1, 2017, at 103, 104-105.

SILIENCE:

15 Sara Brooks, What Protection for the Internally Displaced in Burma/Myanmar?, 12 AUSTL. J.
HUM. RTS., no. 2, 2007, at 27, 29. On corporate-induced displacement in Burma, see Ana Natsvlishvili,
Multinational Corporations in Resource Rich Yet Poor Countries: Human Rights Perspective, 35 (2008)
(LLM Thesis, Central European University).
16 See William Thomas Worster, The Evolving Definition of the Refugee in Contemporary International Law, 30 BERKELEY J. INT’L LAW, 94, 139 (2012); WORKING GROUP II, INTERGOVERNMENTAL
PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014: IMPACTS, ADAPTATION, AND VULNERABILITY –
PART A: GLOBAL AND SECTORAL ASPECTS 628, 771 (Christopher B. Field et al. eds., 2014).
17 See U.N. Human Rights: Office of the High Commissioner, Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations “Protect, Respect and Remedy” Framework, 3-4
(2011), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/GuidingPrinciplesBusinessHR_EN.pdf; The
Maastricht Principles on Extra-Territorial Obligations in the Area of Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (2011), https://www.ciel.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/Maastricht_ETO_Prin
ciples_21Oct11.pdf.
18 See Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (“O.E.C.D.”), Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises, 3-4 (2011) https://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/mne/48004323.pdf.
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Treaty).19 Because the previous approach to the field was encased in the logic of
‘closing the governance gap’ without necessarily hardening accountability demands into legal obligations,20 even the initiation of these negotiations was quite
a momentous achievement. The Treaty aims to ensure corporations’ responsible
behavior throughout the supply chain, as well as to provide victims with appropriate fora and procedures to seek remedies. Under this Treaty, States would be
responsible for failing to prevent and prosecute the misconduct of businesses or
business activities falling within their prescriptive jurisdiction,21 regardless of
where the adverse effects occur. Indeed, while States cannot be held responsible
under public international law (PIL) for corporate misconduct per se, nor can
corporations themselves bear responsibility under PIL, a number of obligations to
prevent and prosecute under the Treaty would be assigned directly to States.22
Most of these are obligations of conduct, while a few are obligations of result.23
UN fora are appropriate for human rights matters involving the link between
environment, migration, and business, as they accord due negotiating room to the
poorest countries whose views are neglected in other diplomatic settings.24 Remarkable progress has been made over the last eight years on both the drafting
process and consensus-building,25 and States seem poised to reach a consensus
on the most disputed issues.26 Even though the discussions are still ongoing, one
might foresee the contribution the Treaty may make (or not make) to PIL and
human rights discourses, and draw a few preliminary remarks as for its potential
impact on public and private actors. Any of the suggestions—not ‘conclusions’ –
19 U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights
Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Revised Draft 3, arts.
1 ¶¶3-5; 3 ¶1 (Aug. 17, 2021) https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/
Session6/LBI3rdDRAFT.pdf (hereinafter Third Revised Draft).
20 Michael Elliot, Problematising the ‘Governance Gap’: [sic] Corporations, Human Rights, and the
Emergence of Transnational Law, 12 TRANSN’L LEGAL THEORY 196, 197, 199 (2021).
21 Kimberley N. Trapp, Jurisdiction and State Responsibility, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF JURISDICTION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 355, 357-65 (Stephen Allen et al. eds., 2019) (In public international
law, ‘prescriptive jurisdiction’ stands for a State’s exercise of its legislative -as opposed to executive or
judicial- powers over its territory and/or citizens).
22 Third Revised Draft, supra note 19, at PP7, PP18, arts. 2(1)(a), 8(1-6; 10).
23 See, e.g., Benoı̂t Mayer, Obligations of Conduct in the International Law on Climate Change: A
Defence, 27 REVIEW EUROPEAN, COMPARATIVE & INT’L ENVTL. L., 130, 130 (2018) (describing the
difference between obligations of conduct and obligations of result).
24 Koko Warner (Head of Environmental Migration, Social Vulnerability and Adaptation Section,
U.N.H.C.R.), Climate Change Induced Displacement: Adaptation Policy in the Context of the UNFCCC
Climate Negotiations, U.N. Doc. PPLA/2011/02, at 13 (May 2011).
25 By this, I do not imply that the negotiations have been characterised by straightforward, problemfree success, but rather that their engaged development is somewhat astonishing compared to the failing
turn it was initially taking. See Riccardo Vecellio Segate, The First Binding Treaty on Business and
Human Rights: A Deconstruction of the EU’s Negotiating Experience Along the Lines of Institutional
Incoherence and Legal Theories, 25 INT’L J. HUM. RTS. (2021) (outlining how the E.U. was explicitly
obstructing any progress, risking jeopardization of the entire process).
26 Which does not mean the Treaty will actually be perfected, or that it will ever gather sufficient
consensus to enter into force. One looming spectre is that of overbroad reservations which would render
ratifications meaningless in practice, not to mention a very probable regional disparity of degrees of
support. Needless to say, because of the networked and highly volatile structure that would involve
global business transactions and operations, a Treaty of this sort can only achieve its intended result if it
is endowed with virtually universal consensus.
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put forward here are, by their nature, tentative (which is why some Sections are
opened by question marks). Due to said provisional nature, this paper aims to
provide additional insights to policymakers and the scholarly communities directly or indirectly implicated in this Treaty-making process, while the latter is
still ongoing.
Section 2 briefly juxtaposes the ‘security narrative’ of migration and climate
change – which depicts the former as catastrophic and the latter as a large-scale
phenomenon only – onto a narrative of climate migrations that originate every
day from the specific (non-)choices of corporations, which should be prosecuted
accordingly as ‘push factors.’27 It is argued that a security-termed social narrative
fails to acknowledge the real source of insecurity that lies—not always, but frequently—with the exploitation pursued by private actors on a local scale, the
aggregated effect thereof representing what is usually defined as ‘climate migration.’ After all, “a simple correlation between climate change and increasing violence does not exist.”28 Humans have always been migrating from continent to
continent, and changes in the climate have accompanied or triggered most of
those spontaneous exoduses and diasporas. If such migrations are now happening
on a more concentrated, ‘abusive,’ and intensive fashion owing to abrupt changes
in the climate – and waiting for international policymakers to reach consensus
over common tools of law and governance to fight climate change globally and
coherently – then perhaps it is worth prosecuting more thoroughly all the corporate exploiters that worsen specific conditions on the ground for many local communities, often without offering those communities any financial or collateral
benefits in return. There are three elements involved in these processes: the migrants, the corporations, and the environment. Despite this, no international legal
instrument exists to link all of them. Indeed, only a single regional arrangement,
the African Union’s Kampala Convention,29 includes all three, and its implementation prospects raise significant doubts.30
Commenting upon a variety of other regional and international attempts at
addressing climate displacement,31 Section 3 elaborates on the reasons why any
legal instrument that links only two of the actors eventually proves ineffective.
Section 4 discusses the influence a new binding Treaty on business and human
27

Cantor, supra note 2.
RYAN P. HARROD & DEBRA L. MARTIN, BIOARCHAEOLOGY OF CLIMATE CHANGE & VIOLENCE:
ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS 24 (2014).
29 African Union Convention for the Protection and Assistance of Internally Displaced Persons in
Africa (Kampala Convention), Dec. 6, 2012, art. 3(1)(i) (requires State parties to “[e]nsure the accountability of non-State actors involved in the exploration and exploitation of economic and natural resources
leading to ‘displacement.’”).
30 See generally International Committee of the Red Cross, Translating the Kampala Convention into
Practice: A Stocktaking Exercise, 99 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 365, 366-70 (2017); Munene C. Kiura,
Kenya in MARGINALISATION: THE PLIGHT OF REFUGEES AND INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS IN EAST
AFRICA 85, 118-20 (Fountain Publishers 2012); Michael Addaney, The Legal Challenges of Offering
Protection to Climate Refugees in Africa in GOVERNANCE, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND POLITICAL TRANSFORMATION IN AFRICA 333, 349-51 (Michael Addaney et al. eds., 2020).
31 For an introductory overview, see Hitomi Kimura, Addressing Climate-Induced Displacement: The
Need for Innovation in International Law, in GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE & INNOVATION IN INT’L LAW 125
(Neil Craik et al. eds., 2018).
28
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rights (B&HR) might have on certain aspects of these migrations (e.g., expatriation documents and consular assistance), thanks to a long-overdue holistic drafting process that acknowledges the interrelation among all three actors. The
obvious danger is that such a comprehensive and ambitious goal may likely,
when subjected to the crucible of politics, collapse under its own weight.
Section 5 analyzes a salient innovation of this Treaty which has been disregarded in scholarly works: the reversal of the ‘persecution paradigm.’32 Especially when framed against the rhetoric of ‘climate refugees,’ ‘persecution States’
are generally defined as the countries from which the refugees seek to escape.
This Treaty operates instead to shift that paradigm towards identifying the States
of persecution as those where TNCs are based (which are not necessarily coincident with the place where the exploitative effects occur) by attributing unambiguously to said States the responsibility for the misconduct of the businesses over
which they extend their jurisdiction. Section 6 tries to balance the benefits and
disadvantages of this Treaty along the lines discussed above, hypothesizing that,
while the instrument as a whole deserves to be regarded under a favorable light,
it does not support well-controlled, state-channeled preventive (or ‘anticipatory’)
migrations. However, it is reasonable to think that this Treaty’s primary lacuna
(at this point in its development) lies in its inability to set a threshold for distinguishing the cases where corporate exploitation is the main pull factor33 from
those where such exploitation is instead an associate cause and alone would not
necessarily be a substantial factor. Put differently, any ‘environmental’ exploitation performed by corporations is situated within broader climate-change dynam32 The expression ‘persecution paradigm’ refers to the most doctrinally conservative, almost dogmatic reading of ‘persecution’ in international refugee law. For selected overviews of mentioned readings, its obsolescence, and its main limitations, see, e.g., Mathilde Manon Crépin, The Notion of
Persecution in the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and Its Relevance to the Protection Needs of Refugees in the 21st Century (2019) (Ph.D. Thesis in Law, King’s College London) (on
file with King’s Research Portal, King’s College London); José H. Fischel de Andrade, On the Development of the Concept of ‘Persecution’ in International Refugee Law, 2 ANUÁRIO BRASILEIRO DE DIREITO
INTERNACIONAL, 114 (2008); Gillian McFadyen, The Contemporary Refugee: Persecution, Semantics
and Universality, (SPECIAL ISSUE), 9, 13-17 (University of Glasgow eSharp online research journal
2012); Vincent Chetail, Are Refugee Rights Human Rights? An Unorthodox Questioning of the Relations
Between Refugee Law and Human Rights Law, in HUMAN RIGHTS & IMMIGRATION, COLLECTED COURSES
OF THE ACADEMY OF EUROPEAN LAW 19, 24-37 (2014).
33 In international refugee law (and migration law more generally), ‘pull factors’ are the reasons that
attract human beings to reach a given jurisdiction once they have planned (or been compelled) to leave
their habitual place of residence. Those factors might bear a shade of voluntarism but are mostly understood as unavoidable and thus forced onto individuals, e.g., logistically, economically, for familial reasons, or through organized deception that promises rights, employment, or safety where there will in fact
be none. For example, see Carla Ferstman, Human Rights Due Diligence Policies Applied to Extraterritorial Cooperation to Prevent “Irregular” Migration: European Union and United Kingdom Support to
Libya, 21 GER. L.J. 459, 481 (2020) (noting as an example that the search-and-rescue operations in the
Mediterranean Sea by, among others, Italy, may represent an unintended pull factor, because migrants
from Africa are led to believe their lives will be safe when attempting to traverse the sea to Continental
Europe). Some literature has opined that the language of pull and push factors is outdated, see, e.g., Hein
de Haas, A Theory of Migration: The Aspirations-Capabilities Framework, 9 COMPARATIVE MIGRATION
STUD. 1, 1-2 (2021). While I selectively support this criticism, I believe that the push/pull terminology
needs to be perpetuated here, as international negotiations still reflect this lexicon. It seems crucial to
note that pull and push factors are also referred to as pull and push forces (and the like) in other publications, see, e.g., Joseph Chamie, International Migration Amid a World in Crisis, 8 J. MIGRATION & HUM.
SEC. 230 (2020) (also providing examples of push and pull factors, id. at 238).
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ics to which all corporations (and thus countries) together contribute; however,
there are situations where specific corporations within a well-defined territory
cause local ‘environmental’ disasters as the primary actor and, due to contingent
dynamics which could have been avoided, did so in isolation from global trends.
The Treaty being negotiated fails—thus far at least—to untangle the blur between the two phenomena, which should rather entail profoundly divergent legal
responses. Section 7 gathers the findings of this study, recalls that the Treaty’s
text is not yet finalized, and concludes by discussing next negotiating steps that
should be monitored and possibly influenced for improvement.
The Treaty’s guiding principle is that companies should be held accountable34
for the workers (and their families) they exploit and contribute to displacing,
because of long-standing and deliberate structures of inequality, imperialism, and
wealth concentration that are too frequently misguided as—or simplistically confined to—stand-alone, insulated environmental factors. Eventually, this Treaty as
it stands does not directly solve the three-element problem outlined in this article,
yet it fosters the emergence of causes of action in tort and it provides room for
advancing certain categories of holistic, multi-causational claims of due diligence
that were precluded before, especially in times of peace. In so doing, it is conceptually sustained by two crucial paradigm shifts regarding the agents of persecution. First, the shift from States themselves to States as those responsible for
‘their’ corporations.35 And second, and importantly, the shift from States usually
associated with the Global South, whose citizens are prone to concede to the
paternalistic admission-as-charity36 discourse propounded by the wealthy club of
nations and masked as international law, to States commonly belonging to the
Global North whose inaction on any link of the supply chain in practice allows
businesses to exploit vulnerable populations by furthering and accelerating the
degradation of their living and working environment.
At the time of writing of this article, the Chair-Rapporteur has released four
drafts: one in July 2018 (the “Zero Draft”),37 another one year later (the “Revised
Draft”),38 the third one in August 2020 (the “Second Revised Draft”),39 and the
34 I will employ the concept of ‘accountability’ to argue that, for the sake of more pertinently
preventing (and/or remedying) ‘environmentally’-motivated displacement and migration flows, corporations should be answerable not only to the States where their parent company is located or their subsidiaries operate, but also to all those individuals (and families) who live in and depend upon the ecosystem
impacted and altered by their activities, sometimes irreversibly. See generally Nadia Bernaz, Conceptualizing Corporate Accountability in International Law: Models for a Business and Human Rights Treaty,
22 HUM. RTS. REVIEW 45 (2020) (thoroughly examining defining shades of and options for corporate
accountability in B&HR).
35 Cf. U.N. Secretary-General, Business and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and Accountability for Corporate Act, ¶ 20, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/4/035 (Feb. 9, 2007).
36 See Vincent Chetail, The Architecture of International Migration Law: A Deconstructivist Design
of Complexity and Contradiction, 111 AJIL UNBOUND 18, 19 (2017).
37 U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights
Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Zero Draft (July 16,
2018) https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session3/DraftLBI.pdf.
38 U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights
Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Revised Draft, (July
16, 2019), https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/
OEIGWG_RevisedDraft_LBI.pdf (hereinafter Revised Draft).
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latest one in August 2021 (the “Third Revised Draft”).40 In what follows, any
reference to this instrument will be based on the Third Revised Draft, which
replaced the Zero, Revised, and Second Revised drafts; thus, any reference to
“the draft” or “the Treaty” will pinpoint to provisions as phrased in the Third
Revised Draft. When the Zero Draft, the Revised Draft, or the Second Revised
Draft are explicitly mentioned, the purpose is to show the evolution—or, most
plausibly, the involution—of a particular trade-off during the negotiations.
II. Corporations as Push-Factors: Displacing Security-Underpinned
Narratives
In the public conversation, positing that climate change is threatening fair resource allocation and international peace41 (as if either element were truly accomplished in the current geopolitical chessboard) is commonplace. One decade
ago, even the U.N. Security Council (UNSC) voiced concerns about the impact
of climate change on international peace and security.42 Similarly, in the private
conversation, the modern approach to dealing with migration is disproportionately underpinned with discourse about security, and concerned business interests
often prevail over reasoned assessments of the situations on the ground. Corporate apparatuses align with bureaucracy and high-level politics to ensure militarization at countries’ borders43 in a mixed commodified competition-insecurity
jargon which blurs the distinction between goods and humans, and “speak[s] to
the social, political, and economic consequences of a more heavily militarized
and bordered world.”44 This is apparent when discussing the US-Mexico dossier,
and happens despite the evidence that most Mexican unrest involves hidden roots
of environmental resistance or adaptation to neoliberal land and resource dispossession.45 Comparable remote-control dynamics are at play in the Mediterranean,
39 U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Legally Binding Instrument to Regulate, in International Human Rights
Law, the Activities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Second Revised Draft
(Aug. 06, 2020) https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session6/
OEIGWG_Chair-Rapporteur_second_revised_draft_LBI_on_TNCs_and_OBEs_with_respect_to_Human_Rights.pdf (hereinafter Second Revised Draft).
40 Third Revised Draft, supra note 19.
41 See, e.g., Camillo Boano et al., Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford, Environmentally
Displaced People: Understanding the Linkages Between Environmental Change, Livelihoods and Forced
Migration, FORCED MIGRATION POL’Y BRIEFINGS, Nov. 2008, at 20-23; EUR. PARL. ASS., A Legal Status
for “Climate Refugee,” Doc. No. 14955, ¶ 9 (Aug. 27, 2019).
42 U.N. Security Council, Security Council, in Statement, Says “Contextual Information” on Possible
Security Implications of Climate Change Important When Climate Impacts Drive Conflict, U.N. Meeting
Coverage SC/10332 (July 20, 2011); see also Andreas Motzfeldt Kravik, The Security Council and Climate Change – Too Hot to Handle?, EJIL:TALK! (2018), https://www.ejiltalk.org/the-security-counciland-climate-change-too-hot-to-handle/.
43 Ansgar Fellendorf & David Immer, The EU’s Responsibility to Protect Environmentally Displaced
People, E-INT’L REL. (2015), https://www.e-ir.info/2015/08/22/the-eus-responsibility-to-protect-environmentally-displaced-people/.
44 WENDY A. VOGT, LIVES IN TRANSIT: VIOLENCE AND INTIMACY ON THE MIGRANT JOURNEY 207
(2018).
45 See generally DARCY TETREAULT, CINDY MCCULLIGH & CARLOS LUCIO, SOCIAL ENVIRONMENTAL
CONFLICTS IN MEXICO: RESISTANCE TO DISPOSSESSION AND ALTERNATIVES FROM BELOW (2018).
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where European countries securitize and outsource migration management by
implementing “special zones for policing migrants and asylum seekers established within the territory of another [S]tate, as well as incentivizing or coercing
other [S]tates to counter unauthorized migration through enhanced patrols.”46
And again, in Colombia, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights (IACtHR)
argues that the grave situation in which the IDPs [internally displaced people]
find themselves is not caused by the [S]tate, but by the armed conflict, and particularly by the illegal armed forces. [. . .] The Court also excluded the evaluation of
the economic interests of landowners, drug traffickers, national and transnational corporations in forced displacement. On the other hand, the Court omitted
to pronounce itself on the link between forced displacement and development,
particularly land tenure in rural areas [. . . In fact,] land tenure was not only seen
by the actors in the armed conflict as a way of gaining control over territory and
population, but as a means of going back to a development scheme of exclusion,
which secured land tenure in the hands of a few landowners, and served the
development of industrial and large scale plantations.47
Against the backdrop of “securitization [. . .] as both political spectacle and
technocracy[, where] contestants evoke crises, enemies, dramatic developments,”48 these Treaty negotiations remind the international community of the
true face of contemporary environmentally-induced displacement, rarely occurring due to the effects of global warming—or more broadly, climate change—
alone.49 Instead, displacement is frequently traversed by corrosive (and corrupted) business practices which can be isolated and prosecuted because they
dramatically accelerate the degradation of a specific environment, or damage the
latter from scratch.
46 Lama Mourad & Kelsey P. Norman, Transforming Refugees into Migrants: Institutional Change
and the Politics of International Protection, 26 EUROPEAN J. OF INT’L RELS., no. 3, 2020, at 687, 697; see
also Itamar Mann, The New Anti-Impunity: Border Violence as Crime, UNIV. PENN. J. INT’L L. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 45) (https://ssrn.com/abstract=3548181).
47 Laura Bernal Bermúdez, A Review of the Interconnectedness and Indivisibility of the Human
Rights, Human Development and Human Security Agendas: The Case of the Colombian Internally Displaced Population, 21 INT’L LAW: REVISTA COLOMBIANA DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 181, 210-11
(2012) (four emphases added).
48 Maria Julia Trombetta, Linking Climate-Induced Migration and Security Within the EU: Insights
from the Securitization Debate, 2 CRITICAL STUD. ON SEC. no. 2, 2014, at 131, 142. For the actual court
opinion, see The Institution of Asylum and Its Recognition as a Human Right in the Inter-American
System of Protection (Interpretation and Scope of Arts. 5, 22(7), and 22(8), in Relation to Art. 1(1),
American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-25/18, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (May 30,
2018), https://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_25_esp.pdf.
49 SCOTT LECKIE & CHRIS HIGGINS, CONFLICT AND HOUSING, LAND, AND PROPERTY RIGHTS: A
HANDBOOK ON ISSUES, FRAMEWORKS, AND SOLUTIONS 101 (Toronto: Cambridge UP 2011); Walter Kälin
& Nina Schrepfer, Protecting People Crossing Borders in the Context of Climate Change: Normative
Gaps and Possible Approaches, UNHCR LEGAL AND PROT. POL’Y RSCH. SERIES 2 (2012) (“Despite the
complex relationship between climate change and population movements, five scenarios can be identified
that trigger such movements. These scenarios are sudden-onset disasters; slow-onset environmental degradation; the destruction of small island [S]tates by rising sea levels; areas designated as prohibited for
human habitation because of mitigation and adaptation measures or because of a high risk of disasters
occurring there; and unrest, violence and conflict over resources diminishing as a consequence of climate
change”).

Volume 18, Issue 1

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

41

Persecution and Labor Migrations

Catastrophic storytelling, therefore, creates a more balanced narrative built on
awareness and precise, codified, enforceable human rights granted to both individuals and affected communities. Such prophetic exclamations speak volumes
on the perverse joint security-exploitation design this Treaty seeks to eradicate:
On behalf of peasant organizations, fishermen, shepherds, and salaried
rural workers, we have realized that this international binding instrument
is increasingly necessary and urgent. While we peasants endeavor to defend our lands and our water, large multinationals monopolize our lands
and displace our communities. And as we strive to defend our forests, our
mangroves, our biodiversity, and the livelihood of our families, we confront transnational private security providers which operate in collusion
with the extra-activist multinationals to obtain the repression and imprisonment of the activists, and the destitution of our democracies and governments that try to oppose their interests. On the other hand, when the
expelled peasant women are forced to emigrate northward to save their
lives, they are held in custody and rejected at the borders, with the intervention of security corporations, causing the suffering and death of
thousands of human beings every year. And even those who manage to
cross the border, are destined for the most part to fill the lowest-paid job
positions, endowed with the lowest possible rights, in agribusinesses –
again of a transnational nature. [. . .] The current conflicts, the climate
emergency, environmental and migratory crises, the defenselessness of all
those who are affected and the discounted outsourcing of our democracies
and rights: are these not in fact “serious and necessary” reasons to keep
striving for the adoption of binding norms?50
50 Representative from the NGO Corporate Accountability International, Oral Statement made at the
Fourth Negotiating Session of the Treaty, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session4/CorporateAccountability.pdf (translated into English by the author, from the original
Spanish) (emphases added),original text:

Desde las organizaciones campesinas, de pescadores, pastores y trabajadores rurales asalariados
constatamos que este instrumento vinculante internacional es cada vez más necesario y urgente.
Cuando los campesinos/as intentamos defender nuestras tierras y nuestro agua nos encontramos
con la grandes multinacionales acaparando nuestros territorios y expulsando nuestras
comunidades. Y cuando queremos defender nuestros bosques, nuestros manglares, nuestra biodiversidad, y el sustento de nuestras familias, nos enfrentamos a las transnacionales de armamentos junto a las multinacionales del extractivismo al servicio de la represión y
encarcelamiento de los actvistas, y de la destrucción de nuestras democracias y de los gobiernos
que intentan oponerse a sus intereses. Por otra parte, cuando las campesinas expulsadas se ven
obligadas a emigrar al norte para salvar su existencia son retenidas y rechazadas en las fronteras,
con intervención de las multinacionales de la seguridad, causando el sufrimiento y la muerte de
miles de seres humanos cada año. Y las que logran llegar pasan en gran medida a cubrir los
puestos peor remunerados y con menos derechos en las empresas de la agroindustria, otra vez de
carácter transnacional. [. . .] Los conflictos actuales, las crisis climáticas, medioambientales,
migratorias, la indefensión de los afectados y la devaluación de nuestras democracias y derechos,
¿no son acaso razones “serias y necesarias” para no aminalarse frente a la adopción de normas
vinculantes?).

See also Sandra Cuffe, Guatemala Mine’s Ex-Security Chief Convicted of Indigenous Leader’s Murder,
THE GUARDIAN, (Jan. 7, 2021, 12:05 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2021/jan/
07/guatemala-nickel-mine-death-adolfo-ich. (recent conviction of the security guard Mynor Padilla by a
Guatemalan judge strikingly resembles the experiences recounted by the Corporate Accountability International Representative).
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‘Serious reasons’ come equally from daily legal practice before the domestic
courts of industrialized countries, with all its shortcomings.51 In the United States
(US),
[t]he Flores decisions illustrate that environmental ATS [Alien Tort Statute] claims brought under a human rights approach [. . .], unsurprisingly,
still have to contain norms well-established as “law of nations.” UN General Assembly resolutions, which are not binding, non-UN declarations,
and decisions of international tribunals were rejected as evidence of a
“law of nations” prohibition of intra-national pollution because they were
not found to be authoritative sources of international law.52

In the United Kingdom (UK) and The Netherlands, too, “there has been a
growing number of lawsuits on behalf of poor communities harmed by corporations, such as against Trafigura for dumping of toxic waste in Côte d’Ivoire and
British Petroleum for oil spills in Colombia, but these have largely been couched
as environmental and product liability issues rather than rights claims.”53 I will
demonstrate that this ‘depersonalization’ of court proceedings initiated for business-caused ‘environmental’ disasters favors identifying corporate responsibilities, albeit accurately, over identifying the social consequences of such disasters,
with particular emphasis on the ensuing displacement and migratory movements.
Beyond procedural discrepancies regarding compensation, evidence, restoration,
and accountability, the delinking of corporate disasters from their non-environmental human-rights dimension in fact removes corporate responsibility for the
human unsettlement such disasters trigger. Instead, far beyond mere judicial
charges of ecological disruption or commercial product safety litigation, it is my
argument that said corporations should be held reasonably accountable for the
displacement and migrations their ‘environmental’ incidents cause as well. In
November 2015, the Fundão tailings dam at the Germano iron ore mine of the
Samarco Mariana Mining Complex in Brazil collapsed onto downstream villages
and released its pollutants in the Doce River.54 But when Brazilian scholars testi51 See generally Ji Ma, Multinational Enterprises’ Liability for the Acts of Their Offshore Subsidiaries: The Aftermath of Kiobel and Daimler, 23 MICH. STATE INT’L L. REV., no. 2, 2015, at 397.
52 Kathleen Jäger, Environmental Claims under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 519,
532 (2010), (four emphases added); For a constructive criticism of this trending judicial self-restraint, see
Anne Medlin Lowe, Customary International Law and International Human Rights Law: A Proposal for
the Expansion of the Alien Tort Statute, 23 IND. INT’L & COMPAR. L. REV. 523 (2013).
53 Chandra Lekha Sriram, Liberal Peacebuilding and Transitional Justice: What Place for Socioeconomic Concerns?, in JUSTICE & ECONOMIC VIOLENCE IN TRANSITION 27, 41 (Dustin N. Sharp ed., 2014).
54 See, e.g., Flávio Fonseca doCarmo et al., Fundão Tailings Dam Failures: The Environment Tragedy of the Largest Technological Disaster of Brazilian Mining in Global Context, 15 PERSP. IN ECOLOGY
AND CONSERVATION, no. 3, 2017, at 145; Paola Pinheiro Bernardi Primo et al., Mining Disasters in
Brazil: A Case Study of Dam Ruptures in Mariana and Brumadinho, 5 CASE STUD. ENV’T 1 (2018); Dom
Phillips, Brazil Dam Disaster: Firm Knew of Potential Impact Months in Advance, THE GUARDIAN (Feb.
28, 2018, 1:55 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/28/brazil-dam-collapse-samarcofundao-mining; Haruf Salmen Espindola et al., Rio Doce: Risks and Uncertainties of the Mariana Disaster (MG), 39 REVISTA BRASILEIRA DE HISTÓRIA 1 (2019); Vanessa Hatje et al., The Environmental Impacts of One of the Largest Tailing Dam Failures Worldwide, 7 SCIENTIFIC REPS. (Sept. 6, 2017); Mauro
Mendonça Magliano & Humberto Angelo, The Lack of Economic Environmental Damage Valuation: A
Critical Review of Fundão Disaster, 26 CERNE 75 (2020).
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fied to the legal significance of this occurrence,55 they failed to mention the displacement it caused and the suffering these losses provoked in the population.56
On top of this, while a private agreement between the responsible TNC and the
Brazilian government was signed (framed in environmental and not human rights
language, resulting in ‘dehumanization’ of both the incident and the scope of the
harm as usual), proceedings taking place in the UK covered a civil-compensation
aspect57 but were later dismissed by Her Majesty’s High Court of Justice in England as tantamount to an abuse of rights. 58 The court reasoned that the same
claim was also brought before Brazilian courts,59 but awards there are lower in
quantum, will probably be delayed, and are arguably subjected to strong pressure
on the part of politico-business cartels. The case has been recently accepted on
appeal,60 but its progress—let alone favorable outcome—is not a given. Compared to its Brazilian counterpart,61 the 1980 U.S. Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) is subsumed under an
even narrower logic of product liability,62 which makes it an unsatisfactory legal
response to corporate ‘environmental’ damage and dissipates the policy impact of
its extraterritorial applicability (which was confirmed in principle—though controversially—by U.S. and Canadian courts).63 Even those who favorably regard
55 See Joana Nabuco & Leticia Aleixo, Rights Holders’ Participation and Access to Remedies: Lessons Learned from the Doce River Dam Disaster, 4 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J., no. 1, 2019, at 147.
56 See, e.g., Andréa Zhouri et al., The Rio Doce Mining Disaster in Brazil: Between Policies of
Reparation and the Politics of Affectations, 14 VIBRANT: VIRTUAL BRAZILIAN ANTHROPOLOGY, no. 2,
2017, at 1, 11, 17-18 (political and anthropological, i.e., non-legal, literature did in fact frame the issue in
such terms); Eliana Santos Junqueira Creado & Stefan Helmreich, A Wave of Mud: The Travel of Toxic
Water, from Bento Rodrigues to the Brazilian Atlantic, 69 REVISTA DO INSTITUTO DE ESTUDOS
BRASILEIROS 33, 37 (2018); Lucas Seghezzo, The Five Dimensions of Sustainability, 18 ENVTL. POL., no.
4, 2009, at 539, 548 (more broadly, one’s living environment embodies ‘a source of facts, identities, and
behaviours [that incapsulates] notions of culture, local ways of life, and human physical and psychological health’); see also Myriam N. Bechtoldt et al., Addressing the Climate Change Adaptation Puzzle: A
Psychological Science Perspective, 21 CLIMATE POL’Y, no. 2, 2020, at 186.
57 See Jonathan Watts, BHP Billiton Facing £5bn Lawsuit from Brazilian Victims of Dam Disaster,
THE GUARDIAN (Nov. 6, 2018, 1:50 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2018/nov/06/bhpbilliton-facing-5bn-lawsuit-from-brazilian-victims-of-dam-disaster.
58 See Neil Hume, UK High Court Blocks £5bn Lawsuit against BHP over Brazil Disaster, FIN.
TIMES, Nov. 9, 2020, https://www.ft.com/content/2550b549-67d2-4df7-b19c-0cc14f6661bf.
59 See India Jordan & Andrew Denny, English Court Strikes Out Claims Against BHP for Brazilian
Dam Collapse, ALLEN & OVERY, Dec. 2, 2020, https://www.allenovery.com/en-gb/global/news-and-insights/publications/english-court-strikes-out-claims-against-bhp-for-brazilian-dam-collapse.
60 Kirstin Ridley, UK Court to Reconsider $6.9 BLN Brazil Dam Lawsuit Against BHP, REUTERS
(May 6, 2021) https://www.reuters.com/business/exclusive-uk-court-reconsider-69-bln-brazil-dam-lawsuit-against-bhp-2021-05-06/.
61 See Bianca Zambão, Brazil’s Launch of Lender Environmental Liability as a Tool to Manage
Environmental Impacts, 18 UNIV. MIAMI INT’L & COMPAR. L. REV. no. 1, 2010, at 47, 86, 93.
62 See GWYNNE L. SKINNER, TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: OVERCOMING
BARRIERS TO JUDICIAL REMEDY 87-88 (2020).
63 See Jaye Ellis, Extraterritorial Exercise of Jurisdiction for Environmental Protection: Addressing
Fairness Concerns, 25 LEIDEN J. OF INT’L L., no. 2, 2012, at 397, 399-408; Guillaume Laganière, Liability for Transboundary Pollution in Private International Law: A Duty to Ensure Prompt and Adequate
Compensation 227-28 (2020) (Unpublished DCL Dissertation, McGill University); Jeffrey Gracer, Dennis Mahony & Tyson Dyck, Cross-Border Litigation Gains Traction in U.S. and Canadian Courts, 20
ENVTL. CLAIMS J. no. 2, 2008, at 181, 184-188.
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CERCLA admit it has a limited application with respect to social aspects of environmental disasters and is instead limited to the mere cleaning-up of areas damaged by pollution, waste dumping, toxic spills, and the discharge of noxious
material.64
Furthermore, the transformation for which this article advocates entails procedural and substantive changes that would be complicated by divergent understandings among lawmakers. As for the indeterminacy of definitions, ambiguity
is not restricted to the realm of environmentally-induced migrations.65 For instance, to date, a legal definition of asylum is still lacking internationally,66 just
like that of migrant.67 Beyond linguistic disagreements,68 however, the IACtHR
has recently issued an advisory opinion that a number of human rights do apply
in the context of migration, even extraterritorially.69 Non-refoulement70 is applied
in absolute terms, and procedural rights (such as the right to a prompt and fair
assessment of protection requests) are upheld accordingly. This was a regional
and non-binding Opinion, and yet, it might influence international legal debate
over the scope and enforceability of the right to seek asylum from persecution.71
64 See, e.g., Jennifer J. Marlow & Lauren E. Sancken, Reimagining Relocation in a Regulatory Void:
The Inadequacy of Existing US Federal and State Regulatory Responses to Kivalina’s Climate Displacement in the Alaskan Arctic, 7 CLIMATE LAW, no. 4, 2017, at 290, 308-09.
65 For a table collecting and systematizing the relevant terms, see Koko Warner, Global Environmental Change and Migration: Governance Challenges, 20 GLOBAL ENVTL. CHANGE 402, 403-04 (2010)
(collecting and systematizing the relevant terms) https://www.stockholmresilience.org/download/
18.3eea013f128a65019c2800010454/1459560566462/Warner+2010.pdf ; see also Rosalı́a Ibarra Sarlat,
Indeterminación del Estatus Jurı́dico del Migrante por Cambio Climático, 20 ANUARIO MEXICANO DE
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 135, 141-155 (2020); Giovanni Sciaccaluga, Defining the Category: Who Are
“Climate Refugees”?, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE PROTECTION OF “CLIMATE REFUGEES” 57-78
(Palgrave 2020) (a definition of “climate refugee”); Madhav Gadgil, Social Change and Conservation, in
THE SAGE HANDBOOK OF ENVIRONMENT AND SOCIETY 485, 491 (Jules Pretty et al. eds., SAGE 2007).
Although I will interpret rhetoric, discourses, and narratives by multiple actors throughout the piece, I am
not concerned with terminology per se, but rather, with a crystal-clear matter of substance, i.e., whether
the international Treaty under negotiation may help bring corporations – and humans – back to the
currently state-centered law of environmental migrations/displacements. Thus, attempting a solution to
unending, and possibly sterile, terminological disputes falls outside the scope of this work’s purpose and
ambitions.
66 Guy S. Goodwin-Gill, The International Law of Refugee Protection, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF REFUGEE AND FORCED MIGRATION STUDIES 36, 42 (Elena Fiddian-Qasmiyeh et al. eds., 2014).
67 Justin Gest et al., Protecting and Benchmarking Migrants Rights: An Analysis of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, 57 INT’L MIGRATION, no. 1, 2019, at 60, 74 note 2.
68 Maria Stavropoulou, The Right Not to be Displaced, 9 AM. UNIV. INT’L L. REV. 689, 692 (1994)
(“[T]he definition of persecution needs to be re-interpreted along the lines of coercion and victimization,
rather than targeting.”).
69 For the text of the case in Spanish, see The Institution of Asylum and its Recognition as a Human
Right in the Interamerican System of Protection, Advisory Opinion OC-25/18, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (May
30, 2018).
70 See generally Matthew Scott, Natural Disasters, Climate Change and Non-Refoulement: What
Scope for Resisting Expulsion under Articles 3 and 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights?, 26
INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 404 (2014); Jane McAdam, Protecting People Displaced by the Impacts of Climate
Change: The UN Human Rights Committee and the Principle of Non-refoulement, 114 AM. J. INT’L L.
708 (2020). Simply put, the expression non-refoulement points to a State’s obligation not to return refugees to the jurisdiction that compelled their departure in the first place, or to other deemed-unsafe
jurisdictions.
71 Massimo Frigo, The Inter-American Court’s Advisory Opinion on Asylum and Its Impact for the
Human Rights of Refugees Worldwide, OPINIO JURIS (Oct. 25, 2018), http://opiniojuris.org/2018/10/25/

Volume 18, Issue 1

Loyola University Chicago International Law Review

45

Persecution and Labor Migrations

It is also an important decision as to environmental migration, requiring foreign
workers to receive protection from the abuses of the companies they work for or
are impacted by, not only in the State where the company is legally domiciled but
also before the courts of third countries (including neighboring countries). Further, the U.N. Human Rights Committee (HRCtee) has recently held that States
are bound not to refouler those migrants whose lives would be at risk due to
environmental degradation and climate change if turned back to their sending
country.72 While it phrased its opinion in traditional terms (in fact, the standard
of proof with regards to life-threatening conditions is almost impossible to meet),
it might signal a legal development in the near future whereby future opinions
might also encompass threats from corporate hinderance to sustainable development due to pollution, land grabbing, soil contamination, and the like. “Since the
exercise of virtually all other rights is contingent upon a sustainable environment[,] [the ‘foundational right’ to a sustainable environment] seems logical.”73
Categorization and consensus on relevant terms are both difficult to achieve
due to several factors including single and multiple causes of migration, the voluntary or involuntary nature of such migrations,74 and their territorial scope.
Whereas disaster-triggered rapid-onset migrations are “short-distance and temporary in nature[, . . .] with populations returning to their areas of origin as soon as
they [a]re allowed [to]”75 (obviously, unless the disaster permanently encumbers
their home lands), slow-onset migrations caused by business behavior are usually
long-distance (but not necessarily trans-border) and definitive. This is because
what is disrupted is exactly the social texture: the relationship of trust amid companies, workers, suppliers, trade unions, and (local) representatives of governmental authorities. For these reasons, one could rather disagree with those who
maintain the overbroad stance that disaster-induced migrants “have no opportunity to remain in their areas of origin [. . . and] when migrating abroad, should be
granted the highest level of protection possible[, including] a permanent right to
stay in the host country,” while we may still agree with the idea of creating
“dedicated technical bodies, and [. . .] adopt a sliding scale protection mechanism
that, depending on the real needs of the migrating individual, would be capable
of granting different levels of protection.”76 The draft Treaty situates itself simithe-inter-american-courts-advisory-opinion-on-asylum-and-its-impact-for-the-human-rights-of-refugeesworldwide/.
72 U.N. Human Rights Committee, Views Adopted by the Committee Under Article 5 (4) of the
Optional Protocol [to the ICCPR], Concerning Communication No. 2728/2016, ¶¶ 9.3-9.5, 9.14, CCPR/
C/127/D/2728/2016 (Oct. 24, 2019); cf. U.N. Human Rights Committee, The Slow Onset Effects of
Climate Change and Human Rights Protection for Cross-Border Migrants, A/HRC/37/CRP.4, ¶¶ 67-68
(Mar. 22, 2018) (report from just two-and-a-half years prior).
73 Sam Adelman, Rethinking Human Rights: The Impact of Climate Change on the Dominant Discourse, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CLIMATE CHANGE 159, 172 (Stephen Humphreys ed., 2009).
74 Marta Bivand Erdal & Ceri Oeppen, Forced to Leave? The Discursive and Analytical Significance
of Describing Migration as Forced and Voluntary, 44 J. ETHNIC & MIGRATION STUD., no. 6, 2018, at
981.
75 Oscar Gómez, Climate Change and Migration: A Review of the Literature 13-14 (Int’l Inst. of Soc.
Stud., The Hague, Working Paper No. 572, 2013).
76 Giovanni Sciaccaluga, Climate Change-Related Disasters and Human Displacement: Towards an
Effective Management System 17-18 (Int’l Fed’n of Red Cross and Red Crescent Soc’ys, Working Paper
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larly when it requires State Parties to “take all necessary legislative, administrative or other action including the establishment of adequate monitoring
mechanisms to ensure [the Treaty’s] effective implementation,”77 which will
prove particularly helpful in the case of “a combination of extreme events and
gradual environmental degradation”78 in order to correctly apportion
responsibilities.
III.

Misinformed Rhetoric of Old-Fashioned Diplomatic (In)action

“In 2005, the Government of Bangladesh [. . .] in alignment with its obligation
under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change developed
a National Adaption Program of Action[, identifying] fifteen priority
projects. . .,”79 none of which even loosely refers to businesses. What leaves one
dismayed is that documents of this kind do not directly mention private actors at
all, as if business exploitation of the environment (and consequently, of resident
workers) and displacement were two distinct and independent policy areas. There
certainty are war-torn or indirectly war-affected examples like those of Syria or
Jordan respectively;80 however, potential peacetime case studies are numerous,
the most infamous ones including the oil-spilled Niger Delta81 and wasteNo. 4, 2015) (emphasis added); cf. Douglas Stephens, Establishing a Positive Right to Migrate as a
Solution to Food Scarcity, 29 EMORY INT’L L. REV.179, 212-14 (2014) (praiseworthy example from
Argentina, when “displaced Paraguayans d[id] not fall neatly into the refugee framework. Some ha[d]
been displaced because their land was surrounded and eventually purchased by multinational corporations. Others were physically forced off their land, while others faced economic dislocation because of
their inability to compete in the new market. [. . . In response,] Argentina revised its immigration law and
passed Law 25.871 in 2004. [. . .] In 2006, [it] launched a national program called “Patria Grande”
designed to regularize immigrant status for irregular immigrants [. . .]. The program regularized almost
half a million people in its first three years, nearly 60% of which [sic] were Paraguayan.”) (emphasis
added).
77 Third Revised Draft, supra note 19, at ¶ 16.1.
78 Warner, supra note 24, at 15.
79 Abdikarim Ali, Climate-Induced Migrants, International Law, and Human Rights: An Assessment
21 (Apr. 2015) (research paper, University of Ottawa) (https://ruor.uottawa.ca/handle/10393/32316).
80 See Jean-François De Hertogh, Climate Change as a Threat Multiplier in the Middle East: A Comparative Analysis of Syria and Jordan (2016) (Master’s thesis, Leiden University) (on file with the Leiden
University Student Repository).
81 Recent press reports about these events are countless. For an academic viewpoint, see Iwebunor
Okwechime, Environmental Conflicts and Forced Migration in the Nigerian Niger Delta, in AFRICA
NOW! EMERGING ISSUES AND ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVES 363 (Adebusuyi Adeniran & Lanre Ikuteyijo
eds., 2018); Adefolake O. Adeyeye, Corporate Responsibility in International Law: Which Way to Go?,
11 SING. Y.B. INT’L L. 141, 144-45 (2007); Bukola Faturoti et al., Environmental Protection in the
Nigerian Oil and Gas Industry and Jonah Gbemre v. Shell PDC Nigeria Limited: Let the Plunder Continue, 27 AFR. J. INT’L & COMPAR. L., no. 2, 2019, at 225. Lawsuits about the environmental disaster in
the Ogoniland failed in the US, but partly succeeded, most recently, in the UK as well as in The Netherlands, see James Beeton, Supreme Court Rules in Okpabi v Royal Dutch Shell Plc and SPDC, INT’L &
TRAVEL L. BLOG (Feb. 12, 2021) (discussing related decisions in the UK), https://internationalandtravellawblog.com/2021/02/12/supreme-court-rules-in-okpabi-v-royal-dutch-shell-plc-and-spdc/; Huib
Shrama, International Parent Company Responsibility: Shell and Oil Spills in Nigeria, LOYENS LOEFF
(Feb. 2, 2021) https://www.loyensloeff.com/en/en/news/news-articles/international-parent-company-responsibility-shell-and-oil-spills-in-nigeria-n21572/ (discussing related decisions in The Netherlands);
Agence-France Press, Shell to Pay $111m over Decades-Old Oil Spills in Nigeria, THE GUARDIAN (Aug.
11, 2021, 7:46 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2021/aug/12/shell-to-pay-111m-over-decades-old-oil-spills-in-nigeria (discussing related decisions in The Netherlands). Hearings are currently
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poisoned Somali coasts.82 These events range from contaminated land and pollution of soils and rivers as the industrial legacy of the Soviet Union in Central
Asia (especially in the Fergana Valley shared by Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan),83 to “Ecuador and Indonesia, [where] corporate decisions caused terrible damage to the indigenous peoples, arguably seriously undermining the ability for them to survive as a culture,”84 to Italy, where “150 people were admitted
to hospital with acute poisoning because of the release of [tons] of substances
containing toxic arsenic in the environment,”85 and Siberia, where “oil spills
spreading over thousands of square kilometers of swamp grasses” have led to
displacement of the Khant and Mansi tribes.86 Further,
[i]t is not just [S]tates that can be held accountable for environmental
change; large multinational corporations are another possible culprit. This
legal avenue was taken by Kivalina, a 400-inhabitant Alaskan village that
had to be relocated further from the coast because global warming had
allegedly resulted in the reduction of sea ice, erosion and a greater vulnerbeing held on the same facts in Milan, Italy as well, against both Shell and Eni, see Jillian Ambrose,
Prosecutors Seek Jail Terms over Shell and Eni Oil Deal in Nigeria, THE GUARDIAN (Jul. 22, 2020, 2:17
PM), https://www.theguardian.com/business/2020/jul/22/prosecutors-seek-jail-terms-shell-eni-executives-nigeria-oil-deal. For additional human rights and environmental impacts from oil refining in the
Niger Delta region, see Anna Cunningham, Amid Pollution and Political Indifference, Nigerians Struggle
to Catch Their Breath, UNDARK (Oct. 22, 2018), https://undark.org/article/air-pollution-lagos/.
82 The case of Somalia is particularly illustrative of a crisis—that of piracy and related migrations—
which has been primarily narrated in security and counterterrorism (or, at best, “environmental,” marine,
and ecological) terms. However, it would be far more logical to frame the crisis in terms of root causes.
logical consequences of Western waste dumping along the seacoast, which served Euro-American businesses (especially enriching transnational mafias with local ties) and resulted in infant cancer as well as
the starvation of once-wealthy settled fishermen and their families facing unprecedented starvation. This
seems to stand as the only rational conclusion one may draw from connecting all relevant dots in a vast
amount of literature. See, e.g., Rep. of the S.C. on the Protection of Somali Natural Resources and
Waters, at ¶ 46, U.N. Doc. S/2011/661 (2011); Matiangai V. S. Sirleaf, Prosecuting Dirty Dumping in
Africa, in THE AFRICAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: DEVELOPMENT AND CHALLENGES 553, 559-561 (Charles C. Jalloh et al. eds., 2019); BRITTANY GILMER
VANDEBERG, POLITICAL GEOGRAPHIES OF PIRACY: CONSTRUCTING THREATS AND CONTAINING BODIES IN
SOMALIA 66 (Palgrave 2014); Anna Sergi & Nigel South, “Earth, Water, Air, and Fire”: Environmental
Crimes, Mafia Power and Political Negligence in Calabria, in ILLEGAL ENTREPRENEURSHIP, ORGANIZED
CRIME AND SOCIAL CONTROL: ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR RICHARD HOBBS 85, 93 (Georgios A.
Antonopoulos ed., Springer 2016); Jatin Dua & Kenneth Menkhaus, The Context of Contemporary
Piracy: The Case of Somalia, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST., no. 4, 2012, at 749, 760-65; Mohamed Abumaye,
Militarism, Askar: Policing and Somali Refugees 40 (2017) (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California
in San Diego) (on file with University of California San Diego eScholarship); AWET TEWELDE
WELDEMICHAEL, PIRACY IN SOMALIA: VIOLENCE AND DEVELOPMENT IN THE HORN OF AFRICA 65-69
(2019); Thean D. Potgieter & Clive H. Schofield, Poverty, Poaching and Pirates: Geopolitical Instability
and Maritime Insecurity off the Horn of Africa, 6 J. INDIAN OCEAN REGION, no. 1, 2010, at 86, 99-105.
83 François Gemenne & Philip Reuchlin, Climate Change and Displacement: Central Asia, 31
FORCED MIGRATION REVIEW 14, 14-15 (2008).
84 Hari M. Osofsky, Environmental Human Rights Under the Alien Tort Statute: Redress for Indigenous Victims of Multinational Corporations, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT’L L. REV. 335, 388 (1997).
85 Ottavio Quirico et al., States, climate change and tripartite human rights: The missing link, in
CLIMATE CHANGE AND HUMAN RIGHTS: AN INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW PERSPECTIVE 7, 15
(Ottavio Quirico & Mouloud Boumghar eds., 2016).
86 John Alan Cohan, Environmental Rights of Indigenous Peoples Under the Alien Tort Claims Act,
the Public Trust Doctrine and Corporate Ethics, and Environmental Dispute Resolution, 20 UCLA J.
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y 133, 143 (2002).
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ability to storm waves and surges. The village sought the responsibility of
24 major industrial companies for their alleged “contributions to global
warming.”87

Besides the ‘indirect’ effects of emissions-caused climate change, there are
two categories of environmentally-linked business harms immediately resulting
in mass human displacement: technological hazards (one may think of the Bhopal or Chernobyl disasters in 1984 and 1986, respectively), and ‘development’
plans, mostly related to dams and irrigation projects.88 At times the difference is
not clear-cut: for example, when “an earthquake leads to a tsunami which exposes management and design flaws in a nuclear power plant, as occurred in
March 2011 at the Fukushima facility in Japan [. . .], identifying the hazard cause
as natural or technological is not so straightforward.”89 At any rate, the superficial attention paid in migration and business and human rights literature to both
these typologies of phenomena, not confined to industry-caused air pollution resulting in global warming, is striking.90 Current literature inexplicably registers
States and organizations (both international organizations91 and NGOs) as the
only collective actors operating at the intersection between the environment and
migrations, and entirely omits business actors.
The impact of the unhealthy relationship between businesses and environmentally related migrations is not new news, yet it has received scant attention over
the last few decades, neither in grey literature92 or academic circles. Even the
latest edited collection93 by the scholar most consistently published on the topic
of climate change and migration over the past few decades includes no chapter
on the present issue. Other monographs and edited volumes do not mention it at
87 Benoı̂t Mayer, Sustainable Development Law on Environmental Migration: The Story of an Obelisk, a Bag of Marbles, and a Tapestry, 14 ENVTL. L. REV., no. 2, 2012, at 111, 127. It can prove difficult
to find a legal basis to prosecute exclusively the “major” emitters, and to distinguish the latter from
supposedly “minor” ones.
88 See Jeanhee Hong, Refugees of the 21st Century: Environmental Injustice, 10 CORNELL J.L. &
PUB. POL’Y, Spring 2021, at 323, 333-334; Mostafa Mahmud Naser, Climate Change, Environmental
Degradation, and Migration: A Complex Nexus, 36 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV., no. 3, 2012,
at 713, 740 note 229; see also Brooke Havard, Seeking Protection: Recognition of Environmentally Displaced Persons Under International Human Rights Law, 18 VILLANOVA ENVTL. L.J., no. 1, 2007, at 65,
71-72.
89 Robert Stojanov, Contextualising Typologies of Environmentally Induced Population Movement,
23 DISASTER PREVENTION & MGMT. 508, 512 (2014).
90 Most scholarly and professionals’ papers just mention the issue en passant, restating the obvious
by advising, e.g., that “business companies are also important policy actors.” Elin Jakobsson, Global
Policy Making on Climate Refugees - What is the problem? (2010) (unpublished thesis, Göteborg University) (on file with the Department of Political Science at Göteborg University).
91 Jan Klabbers, Notes on the Ideology of International Organizations Law: The International Organization for Migration, State-Making, and the Market for Migration, 32 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 383 (2019).
92 See, e.g., Oli Brown, Migration and Climate Change, in 31 IOM MIGRATION RESEARCH SERIES,
INT’L ORG. FOR MIGRATION (2008); Government Office for Science, London, Migration and Global
Environmental Change: Future Challenges and Opportunities (2011), https://www.gov.uk/government/
publications/migration-and-global-environmental-change-future-challenges-and-opportunities.
93

CLIMATE CHANGE

AND

DISPLACEMENT: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES (Jane McAdam ed.,

2010).
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all,94 nor do extensive student endeavors.95 Businesses are investigated for managing migration detention centers,96 but they are virtually never examined as selfstanding environmental push factors.
This is worsened by objective limitations in quantifying environmentally-related forms of persecution in empirical reviews.97 Scholarly works redundantly
acknowledge that “looking at migration uniquely from an environmental perspective consequently takes away some of the political responsibility from actions
which may have deliberately been taken.”98 Yet such works keep attributing
these actions to States, while failing to legally problematize the centrality that
international relations and governance theories have long attached to transnational business activities99 and their influence in the context of mass migratory
movements. The 2008 “Malabo” Protocol to the Statute of the African Court of
Justice and Human Rights, though undeniably innovative from a public international law (PIL) perspective for criminalizing serious corporate acts of illicit exploitation of natural resources,100 ultimately fails to connect this obligation with
migratory phenomena. Neither the 2016 ILC Draft Articles on the Protection of
Persons in the Event of Disasters, nor the 2014 ILA Declaration of Legal Principles Relating to Climate Change, hint at such a nexus.101 Endorsing a view
whereby environmentally displaced persons (EDPs)102 “tend to be reduced to a
94 Unfortunately, recent examples are uncountable. See, e.g., MATTHEW SCOTT, CLIMATE CHANGE,
DISASTERS, AND THE REFUGEE CONVENTION (James Hathaway & Sarah A. Degan eds., 2020); PEOPLE ON
THE MOVE IN A CHANGING CLIMATE: THE REGIONAL IMPACT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CHANGE ON MIGRATION (Etienne Piguet & Frank Laczko eds., 2014); MIGRATION, RISK MANAGEMENT AND CLIMATE
CHANGE: EVIDENCE AND POLICY RESPONSES (Andrea Milan et al. eds., 2014).
95 See, e.g., IMBR Contributors, International Migrants Bill of Rights with Commentary, 28 GEO.
IMMIGR. L.J., no. 1, 2013, at 23.
96 See Daria Davitti, Beyond the Governance Gap: Accountability in Privatized Migration Control,
21 GERMAN L.J. 487 (2020); Ioannis Kalpouzos, International Criminal Law and the Violence Against
Migrants, 21 GERMAN L.J. 571 (2017); see also Michael Flynn, Global Detention Project, Kidnapped,
Trafficked, Detained? The Implications of Non-State Actor Involvement in Immigration Detention, 5 J.
ON MIGRATION & HUM. SEC. 593 (2017).
97 Marion Borderon et al., Migration Influenced by Environmental Change in Africa: A Systematic
Review of Empirical Evidence, 41 DEMOGRAPHIC RSCH. 491, 525 (2019).
98 Joseph Kweku Assan & Therese Rosenfeld, Environmentally Induced Migration, Vulnerability
and Human Security: Consensus, Controversies and Conceptual Gaps for Policy Analysis, 24 J. INT’L
DEV. 1046, 1050 (2012).
99 See, e.g., In Song Kim & Helen V. Milner, Multinational Corporations and Their Influence
Through Lobbying on Foreign Policy, Brookings Inst. 1, 2 (2019), https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2019/12/Kim_Milner_manuscript.pdf.
100 See also Daniëlla Dam-de Jong & James Graham Stewart, Illicit Exploitation of Natural Resources, in THE AFRICAN COURT OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN AND PEOPLES’ RIGHTS IN CONTEXT: DEVELOPMENT AND CHALLENGES 590-618 (Charles C. Jalloh et al. eds., 2019).
101 U.N. International Law Commission, Draft Articles on the Protection of Persons in the Event of
Disasters (2016), available at https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/draft_articles/
6_3_2016.pdf; International Law Association, Int’l Federation of the Red Cross, Declaration of Legal
Principles Relating to Climate Change, Res. 2/2014 (2014), available at https://disasterlaw.ifrc.org/media/1739?language_content_entity=en.
102 Whilst environmental migrants are not necessarily facing life-threatening hazards or serious deterioration of their living standards, ‘environmentally displaced persons’ are defined as those who flee situations which gravely undermine their existence and wellbeing. Nevertheless, the reader is advised there is
no agreement on this or related terms in legal scholarship. See M. Rezaul Islam & Niaz Ahmed Khan,
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consequence of climate change,”103 the dominant narrative as enshrined in, for
example, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 and similar soft documents104 indeed describes businesses as passive victims of globalwarming-triggered environmental disasters, and migrants as unavoidable human
influxes of apocalyptic scale,105 which will inevitably invade the advanced countries of the industrialized hemisphere in due course.106 This type of rhetoric of
inevitability, grounded in passivity, is in my view an expression of what other
scholars have “labelled an ‘adaptive’ model of disaster regulation, in terms of
[its] relationship to the greater system of international law: [it] seek[s] to develop, adapt, and particularize the application of norms from other, more established subfields to disaster situations.”107 This is exacerbated by a debate on
climate change which is, in itself, already polarized between climate-skepticism
and eco-alarmism.108 Less focus on the environment per se, the stigmatization of
migrants, and the victimization of local businesses109 is advisable. Instead,
Threats, Vulnerability, Resilience and Displacement Among the Climate Change and Natural DisasterAffected People in South-East Asia: An Overview, 23 J. ASIA PAC. ECON. 297, 300-301 (2018).
103 Christina Ninfa Daszkiewicz, Environmentally Displaced Persons at the Crossroad of Environmental, Human Rights, Asylum and Economic Law: A European Perspective for a Future Framework 98
(Oct. 2018) (unpublished LL.M thesis, University of Iceland) (on file with Semantic Scholar).
104 The Sendai Framework was promoted by the U.N. Office for Disaster Risk Reduction (UNDRR),
see Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030, Assembly Res. A/RES/69/283 (Jun. 3,
2015). For a discussion of other soft documents deploying this narrative, see Elisa Fornalé & Sophia
Kagan, Climate Change and Human Mobility in the Pacific Region: Plans, Policies and Lessons Learned
39 (Global Knowledge Partnership on Migration and Development, Working Paper No. 31, 2017).
105 See, e.g., Margaret E. Peters, Trading Barriers: Immigration and the Remaking of Globalization
229 (Princeton University Press 2017) (deploying this disgracefully condescending phrasing “One could
imagine that the threat of tens of millions of Bangladeshi migrants might lead the European Union to
send Dutch engineers to build better dikes there. Flows of climate migrants fleeing desertification in
Africa might be stopped with drought-tolerant food crops and better irrigation systems developed in
California.”). The urgency is more about not having locally incorporated subsidiaries of TNCs that pollute the environment and displace the population than about importing Dutch engineers to Bangladesh as
to constrain outgoing migration flows!
106 Stephen Castles, Concluding Remarks on the Climate Change-Migration Nexus, in MIGRATION
AND CLIMATE CHANGE 415, 419 (Etienne Piguet et al. eds., 2011) (“However well intentioned, such
shock tactics are risky: not only do they present questionable data, which might undermine public trust in
environmental predictions. More seriously, they reinforce existing negative images of refugees as a threat
to the security, prosperity and public health of rich countries in the [G]lobal North. Thus the doomsday
prophecies of environmentalists may have done more to stigmatize refugees and migrants and to support
repressive state measures against them, than to raise environmental awareness. In response, refugee and
migration scholars have argued that such neo-Malthusian visions are based on dubious assumptions and
that it is virtually impossible to identify individuals or groups forced to move by environmental factors
alone [. . .T]he politicization and polarization of the debate on migration and the environment has had
quite negative consequences.”). See also Camillo Boano et al., Environmentally Displaced People: Understanding the Linkages Between Environmental Change, Livelihoods and Forced Migration, Oxford
Dep’t of Int’l Dev. Forced Migration Policy Briefing 1, 20-21 (2008).
107 Rhys Carvosso, The Reactive Model of Disaster Regulation in International Law and Its Shortcomings, 34 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 957, 958 (2021).
108 Benoı̂t Mayer, “Environmental Migration” as Advocacy: Is It Going to Work?, 29 REFUGE, no. 2,
2014, at 27, 30; Alfredo dos Santos Soares, Protecting Environmentally Displaced Persons Under the
Kampala Convention: A Brief Assessment, 9 REVISTA CATALANA DE DRET AMBIENTAL 1, 16 (2014).
109 Anja Mihr, Climate Justice, Migration and Human Rights, in CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION AND
HUMAN RIGHTS: LAW AND POLICY PERSPECTIVES 45, 60 (Dimitra Manou, et al. eds., 2017) (“It goes
without saying that climate change can have a significant impact on business activity. . . . Subsequently,
climate change becomes a cost factor as well as a risk factor because it affects the cost of everything in
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awareness-building110 and responsibility-bearing policies should be designed for
those in the Global North who exploit workers at the level of their sustainable
survival by degrading their living environment using sub-contractual and mostly
undemocratic relationships.
To overcome these short-sighted constraints, one may begin by looking at the
growing inter-regime literature on migration and human rights111 and at policy
standardization in business and human rights,112 draw analogies, and extrapolate
relevant starting points for research. “There is . . . significant debate as to the
definition of “climate-induced” migration; displacement due to actual loss of
land, due to natural disasters, or due to development-related issues, particularly
food security as arable land is affected, are all significant concerns that arise in
scholarship and policymaking debates.”113 Here too, one finds no mention of
either criminal or negligent business practices affecting the environment and, in
turn, relevant (segments of) local114 populations. General suggestions on explicthe production line. Most large multinational companies have been either indifferent or hostile to advocacy on climate change. Now, though, an increasing number are pressing for action and calling for clear
government signals and policy options to support mitigation. [. . .] Many business leaders have finally
realised that they need to steer their investment decisions in a more sustainable direction in order to keep
up with their more forward-thinking competitors.”) (emphasis added).
110 In policy and disaster-management literature, it is often suggested that awareness-building is a
‘soft duty’ owed by corporate managers to the civil society of the territories where they operate, with
regards to possible natural hazards employees might be exposed to while working in those areas, because
the latter are per se environmentally risky, see Repaul Kanji & Rajat Agrawal, Exploring the Use of
Corporate Social Responsibility in Building Disaster Resilience Through Sustainable Development in
India: An Interpretive Structural Modelling Approach, 6 PROGRESS DISASTER SCI. 1, 3 (ScienceDirect
Apr. 2020). Instead, here we are referring to making corporations aware of the ‘environmental’ hazards
they cause or escalate through their operations.
111 See generally IRREGULAR MIGRATION AND HUMAN RIGHTS: THEORETICAL, EUROPEAN AND INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVES (Barbara Bogusz et al. eds., 2004); HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE DARK SIDE OF
GLOBALISATION: TRANSNATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AND MIGRATION CONTROL (Thomas GammeltoftHansen & Jens Vedsted-Hansen eds., 2017); ARIADNA ESTÉVEZ, HUMAN RIGHTS, MIGRATION, AND SOCIAL CONFLICT: TOWARDS A DECOLONIZED GLOBAL JUSTICE (2012); MIGRATION, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND
DEVELOPMENT: A GLOBAL ANTHOLOGY (Anne T. Gallagher ed., Int’l Debate Educ. Ass’n 2013); CHALLENGING THE BORDERS OF JUSTICE IN THE AGE OF MIGRATIONS (Juan Carlos Velasco & MariaCaterina La
Barbera eds., 2019).
112 See, e.g., The Ten Principles of the UN Global Compact, UNITED NATIONS GLOBAL COMPACT,
https://www.unglobalcompact.org/what-is-gc/mission/principles; see also Institutional Service for
Human Rights, Business and Human Rights Treaty: Key Issues Start to Crystalize but Attention on the
Protection of Human Rights Defenders Remains Inadequate (Oct 26, 2016), https://www.businesshumanrights.org/fr/derni%C3%A8res-actualit%C3%A9s/business-and-human-rights-treaty-key-issuesstart-to-crystallise-but-attention-on-the-protection-of-human-rights-defenders-remains-inadequate/. Note
that this 2000 Global Compact and its ‘Ten Principles,’ addressed to businesses, should not be confused
with the 2018 Global Compact for Migration, the 2018 Global Compact on Refugees, or the 2019 unsuccessful Global Pact for the Environment, all three of which I briefly comment upon infra. There seemed
to be no legal reason to differentiate terminologically between ‘compacts’ and ‘pacts.’ See THOMAS
GAMMELTOFT-HANSEN, ET AL., WHAT IS A COMPACT? MIGRANTS’ RIGHTS AND STATE RESPONSIBILITIES
REGARDING THE DESIGN OF THE UN GLOBAL COMPACT FOR SAFE, ORDERLY AND REGULAR MIGRATION
12 (Raoul Wallenberg Institute of Human Rights & Development Law 2018).
113 Heather Johnson, Immigration and International Relations, OXFORD BIBLIOGRAPHIES (2017). In a
strikingly similar vein, see Mehari Taddele Maru, Causes, Dynamics, and Consequences of Internal
Displacement in Ethiopia 17 (Ger. Inst. for Int’l and Sec. Affs., Working Paper No. FG 8, May 2017).
114 ‘Local’ should never be confused for ‘small.’ For example, the heavily oil-polluted area of Niger
Delta is roughly as extended as one fifth of the whole territory of Italy! See generally David I. Little, et
al., Sediment Hydrocarbons in Former Mangrove Areas, Southern Ogoniland, Eastern Niger Delta, Ni-
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itly including people displaced by gradual environmental degradation within the
scope of the U.N. Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement (GPID)115 had
been put forward at the Council of Europe. While case-study research has been
carried out on the nexus between environmental degradation and migration,116
the link between corporate behavior and the other two elements has rarely been
legally or politically unpacked.
Globally, although multiple UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolutions have
invited corporations to join efforts with States and contribute to sustainable developmental plans,117 no binding instrument addresses the issue. Several international industry-led frameworks do exist,118 but they are voluntary, unaccountable
to civil society, inefficacious,119 and not one of them singles out migratory issues
stemming from environmental degradation. When it comes to international statedriven efforts, outcomes have not proven more convincing thus far. To begin
with, the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) 120 has left the situation of ‘climate refugees’ (and the like) deliberately unaddressed.121 Further, the Global
Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) was endorsed by the
UNGA in December 2018,122 but although celebrated for its significance as “the
first international agreement to recognize climate migration,”123 it is not an international treaty. Moreover, key migration ‘destination’ countries and TNCs’ primary countries of incorporation (the U.S., Australia, Italy) either voted against
the GCM or abstained, thus significantly weakening its political weight. To make
things worse, even linguistically, both Compacts contributed to sanctioning the
seasoned dichotomy between economic migrants and political refugees.124 There
geria, in THREATS TO MANGROVE FORESTS: HAZARDS, VULNERABILITY, & MANAGEMENT 323 (Christopher Makowski & Charles Finkl eds., 2018).
115 Kälin & Schrepfer, supra note 49, at 46-47.
116 Tessa Schmedding, Environmental Migration: A Global Issue Under European Union Leadership?
45 (2011) (Master’s Thesis) (on file at Institut Européen des Hautes Études Internationales).
117 See, e.g., G.A. Res. 73/254, Towards Global Partnerships: A Principle-Based Approach to Enhanced Cooperation Between the United Nations and All Relevant Partners’ (Jan. 16, 2019).
118 For instructive table of industry-specific frameworks, see Shiro Hori & Sachi Syugyo, The Function of International Business Frameworks for Governing Companies’ Climate Change-Related Actions
Toward the 2050 Goals, 20 INT’L ENVITL. ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L. & ECON. 541, 549 (2020).
119 Daniel Iglesias Márquez, The Scope of Codes of Conduct for Corporate Environmental Responsibility, 6 REVISTA CATALANA DE DRET AMBIENTAL, no. 2, 2015, at 1.
120 G.A. Res. 73/151 Global Compact for Refugees (Dec. 19, 2018).
121 See Gillian Doreen Triggs & Patrick C.J. Wall, ‘The Makings of a Success:’ The Global Compact
on Refugees and the Inaugural Global Refugee Forum, 32 INT’L J. REFUGEE L., 283, 301 (2020); see, c.f.,
Antoine Pécoud, Narrating an Ideal Migration World? An Analysis of the Global Compact for Safe,
Orderly and Regular Migration, 42 3D WORLD Q., no. 1, 2021, at 16, 27.
122 G.A. Res. 73/195, Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (Dec. 19, 2018).
123 Elspeth Guild et al., From Zero to Hero? An Analysis of the Human Rights Protections Within the
Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), 57 INT’L MIGRATION, no. 6, 2019, at
43, 51; see also Alan Desmond, A New Dawn for the Human Rights of International Migrants? Protection of Migrants’ Rights in Light of the UN’s SDGs and Global Compact for Migration, 16 INT’L J.L.
CONTEXT 222, 229 (2020).
124 See Annick Pijnenburg & Conny Rijken Moving Beyond Refugees and Migrants: Reconceptualising the Rights of People on the Move, 23 INT’L J. POSTCOLONIAL STUD. 273 (2021), for an extensive
discourse on the topic.
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is also the Global Pact for the Environment, which was being negotiated during
the first months of 2019.125 It appeared in principle more promising due to its
prospected bindingness and the large consensus it initially gathered among world
powers. Still, the initiative failed126 during its third negotiating round. However,
this failure bears no appreciable consequence for the problems being raised in the
present analysis. The Pact’s shortcomings in this respect had been already outlined in literature, one year prior to its eventual breakdown:
The Pact provides in draft article 2 for a broadly formulated duty of care,
which might rightly be seen as a natural corollary to the right to an ecologically sound environment. [. . .] Whether or not such a broad duty of
care across such a diverse range of actors could be said strictly to be an
existing principle of [international environmental law], this is a comprehensive formulation establishing a thoroughgoing and all-embracing duty
of care that is potentially applicable to a wide range of state and non-state
entities[, . . .] such as transnational corporations. [. . .] [T]he technique
[is] often used in soft law to include moral injunction opposable to all,
and more precise rule opposable only to [States]. But, of course, the Pact
is not meant to be soft law. And thus, how is such a provision meant to be
understood? Previous attempts to impose direct legally binding international rules on transnational corporations [were] met with derision and
scorn. The same would arguably be true here. If, on the other hand, there
was no intention to impose such an obligation, what notion of “duty” as a
legal concept is this, within a binding treaty? Unless the Pact challenges
the systemic nature of intergovernmental relations, such horizontal application will be limited to that implemented in domestic law.127

On a more local note, the signing of, for example, the Escazú Agreement128 by
twelve Latin American countries, in September 2019, was welcomed widely as a
125 See generally G.A. Res. 72/277, Towards a Global Pact for the Environment (May 14, 2018). With
this Resolution, the UNGA established an intergovernmental working group dedicated to the elaboration
of this Pact.
126 See Rep. of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group Established Pursuant to General Assembly
Resolution 72/277, U.N. Doc. A/AC.289/6/Rev. 2, (June 13, 2019) (speaking only of recommendations
to move forward); Follow-Up to the Report of the Ad Hoc Open-Ended Working Group Established
Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 72/277, U.N. Doc. A/RES/73/333 (Sept. 5, 2019) (acknowledging this diplomatic fiasco).
127 Louis J. Kotzé & Duncan French, A Critique of the Global Pact for the Environment: A Stillborn
Initiative or the Foundation for Lex Anthropocene?, 18 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL., L. & ECON.
811, 825-26 (2018) (emphasis added). The critique offered by these authors is exceedingly relevant, as
they outline how this Pact would have had a horizontal effect on human rights domestically but not
directly under public international law. On the distinction between the two, see Stephen Gardbaum,
Positive and Horizontal Rights: Proportionality’s Next Frontier or a Bridge Too Far?, in PROPORTIONALITY: NEW FRONTIERS, NEW CHALLENGES 221, 237-41 (Victor Tushnet ed., 2017); C. Lottie Lane, The
Horizontal Effect of International Human Rights Law in Practice, 5 EUROPEAN J. COMPARATIVE L. &
GOVERNANCE, 5, 27-28 (2018).
128 U.N. Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, Regional Agreement on Access
to Information, Public Participation and Justice in Environmental Matters in Latin America and the Caribbean, Mar. 4, 2018 (imposing obligations on signatory States).
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landmark victory in by human-rights NGOs129 as well as the popular press.130 In
contrast, in terms of business and human rights, there is almost nothing to celebrate. The only reference to corporations is traceable in Article 6(13), requiring
Parties to “encourage public and private companies, particularly large companies,
to prepare sustainability reports that reflect their social and environmental performance,” and to do so in accordance with their capacity. The language in this
Agreement, merely mandating encouragement, echoes both the soft corporate social responsibility rhetoric131 built on internal auditing and claimed self-accountability measures, and idea of ‘progressive realization,’ i.e., the “progressive
character of the development of social, economic and cultural rights,” borrowed
from the International Convention on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(ICESCR).132 The latter concept functions as an escape route for corporate actors. Here, the requirement is not even progressive but simply tailored to the
actual abilities of each Party, although Article 3(c) does mention progressive
realization, together with ‘non-regression.’133
IV.

Featuring a New Binding Instrument Targeting Businesses

The new Treaty would take a far-reaching stance on human rights. Art. 5.3
currently states, “State Parties shall investigate all human rights abuses covered
under this (Legally Binding Instrument), effectively, promptly, thoroughly and
impartially, and where appropriate, take action against those natural and/or legal
persons found responsible, in accordance with domestic and international
law.”134 An earlier formulation mentioned “all human rights”135 without specifying they were those that actually would have been covered by the Treaty, but the
outstanding issue concerns the clarification of what ‘international law’ stands for
here. This legalistic, far-reaching provision did not persuade some delegations,136
129 See, e.g., Duncan Tucker, Americas: Historic Environmental and Human Rights Treaty Gains
Momentum as 12 Countries Sign, AMNESTY INT’L (Sept. 27, 2018, 12:04 PM), https://www.amnesty.org/
en/latest/news/2018/09/americas-12-countries-sign-historic-environmental-treaty/.
130 E.g., Vivek H. Maru, Why Planetary Survival Will Depend on Environmental Justice, L.A. TIMES
(Apr. 22, 2021, 3:05 AM), https://www.latimes.com/opinion/story/2021-04-22/environmental-justiceperu-escazu-agreement.
131 See Ana Èertanec, The Connection Between Corporate Social Responsibility and Corporate Respect for Human Rights, 10 DANUBE: L., ECON. & SOCIAL ISSUES REV., no. 2, 2019, at 103 (discussing
this soft rhetoric).
132 The technical concept of the ‘progressive realization’ of human rights is deeply insidious, see
Luisa Maria Silva Merico, Environment and Development Within the Inter-American Human Rights System, in HUM. RTS. & ENV’T, 263, 274 (César Barros Leal ed., 2017) (courts have already employed it, for
instance, to dismiss developmental claims which did not feature “an adequate sample of domestic
conditions.”).
133

Third Revised Draft, supra note 19, at art. 3(c).

134

Third Revised Draft, supra note 19, at art. 5(3) (emphasis added).

135

Revised Draft, supra note 38, at art. 4(10) (emphasis added).

136

Luis Gallegos (Chair Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council), Draft Rep. on the Fourth Session
of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights, ¶ 39, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/RES/26/9 (Oct. 19, 2018)
(hereinafter Fourth Session, Draft Rep.).
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and the consistent reference to “all human rights” in the Preambles137 had been
(factiously, but rightly) labelled as “illogical from both a practical and legal perspective.”138 A more focused formulation would, for example, specify that ‘international law’ equates to the commitments States have already undertaken.
Migration literature did not fail to reiterate that those displaced or migrating are
in fact rights-holders under existing multilateral human rights treaties and regional arrangements although not generally as migrants or displaced people.
Rather, under general multi-lateral human rights treaties such as the 1966 [Int’l
Covenant on Civil and Political Rts. (ICCPR)] and 1966 International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), [S]tates already have obligations to respect, protect, and fulfil the rights contained therein of people within
their jurisdiction. That these people migrate or are displaced by climate change
within the [S]tate’s jurisdiction does not divest them of the rights they enjoy.139
Second-generation rights, like those to health or to food, are particularly sensitive in this regard. Although their positive provision cannot be justiciable, Constitutions in several States have started to incorporate their functional necessity as
corollaries for the enjoyment of the right to life140 or the right not to be subjected
to inhuman or degrading treatment.141 Furthermore, the HRCtee’s non-binding,
yet highly authoritative General Comment (GC) No. 36 on the ICCPR Art. 6(1)’s
Right to Life, referring to the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights, observed as follows:
States parties must take appropriate measures to protect individuals
against deprivation of life by [. . .] foreign corporations operating within
their territory or in other areas subject to their jurisdiction. They must
also take appropriate legislative and other measures to ensure that all activities taking place in whole or in part within their territory and in other
places subject to their jurisdiction, but having a direct and reasonably
foreseeable impact on the right to life of individuals outside their territory, including activities taken by corporate entities based in their terri137 Revised Draft, supra note 38, preamble; Second Revised Draft, supra note 39, preamble; Third
Revised Draft, supra note 19, preamble.
138 Representative of the Geneva-based NGO International Organisation of Employers, Oral Statement made during the Fourth Session of the Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights (Oct. 15-19, 2018),
(available at https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WGTransCorp/Session4/
IOEArticles1_14_15.pdf).
139 Bruce Burson, Protecting the Rights of People Displaced by Climate Change: Global Issues and
Regional Perspectives, in CLIMATE CHANGE AND MIGRATION: SOUTH PACIFIC PERSPECTIVES 159, 169
(Bruce Burson ed., 2010); see also Cosmin Corendea, Migration and Human Rights in the Wake of
Climate Change: A Policy Perspective Over the Pacific, 2 UNU-EHS PUBLICATION SERIES POLICY REPORT, at 38 (2017).
140 Burson, supra note 139, at 163.
141 See Colm O’Cinneide, The Present Limits and Future Potential of European Social Constitutionalism, in THE FUTURE OF ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL RIGHTS 324, 333 (Katharine G. Young ed., 2019); Katie
Anne Boyle & Edel Hughes, Identifying Routes to Remedy for Violations of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 22 INT’L J. HUM. RTS., no. 1, 2018, at 43, 52; Ellen Wiles, Aspirational Principles or
Enforceable Rights? The Future for Socio-Economic Rights in National Law, 22 AM. UNIV. INT’L L.R.
35, 41 (2006).
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tory or subject to their jurisdiction, are consistent with [A]rticle 6, taking
due account of related international standards of corporate responsibility,
and of the right of victims to obtain an effective remedy. [. . . The
i]mplementation of the obligation to respect and ensure the right to [. . .]
life with dignity, depends, inter alia, on measures taken by States parties
to preserve the environment and protect it against harm, pollution and
climate change caused by public and private actors.142

Provided that, “as many philosophers think, duties not to harm are generally
more stringent than duties to aid,”143 this GC properly upholds the status of “second-generation” welfare rights, which are accomplished when individuals can
live their life with dignity without being harmed by irresponsible corporate conduct. “A universal environmental right cannot emerge as long as the West privileges individual rights over group rights and solidarity or third generation rights,
which must be made fully justiciable. Non-state actors, especially transnational
corporations, must be brought fully within the ambit of human rights law as duty
bearers.”144
The ill fate of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of
All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, with fifty-four Parties from
sending countries exclusively to date, should have taught us that too wide-encompassing treaties should not be adopted, as their destiny will be to not solve the
problems which prompted their initiation. The low ratification rate of this and the
ILO Conventions “shows that few [S]tates are actually keen to recognize and
protect even the [most] basic human rights in the case of economic migrants.”145
However, the subject migrants of the (hopefully) upcoming Treaty would stand
halfway between economic migrants and asylum seekers. There is indeed an element of persecution, coupled with one of ‘redemption’ by a more prosperous,
dignified life. With regards to environmental migrants, author Assan wondered,
“In what way are people displaced by environmental degradation/climatic variability different from people who migrate because their sources of livelihoods are
destroyed because of economic hardship?”146 In principle there is no difference,
but when business misconduct adds direct or indirect elements of persecution to
unfavorable alterations of the environment, then such difference indeed emerges,
and legal consequences should follow suit. That environmental migrants differ
from traditional refugees is true insofar as the former may still rely on the protec142 U.N. Hum. Rts. Committee (HRCtee), General Comment No. 36 (2018) on Article 6 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, on the Right to Life, ¶¶ 22, 62, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/GC/
36 (Oct. 30, 2018) (emphasis added). This reasoning has been already applied in several cases of ‘climate
change’ migrations, but there have been no decisions yet regarding business co-responsibilities in such
‘climate change’ migrations. See also Jefferi Hamzah Sendut, Climate Change as a Trigger of NonRefoulement Obligations Under International Human Rights Law, EJIL:TALK! (Feb. 6, 2020) https://
www.ejiltalk.org/climate-change-as-a-trigger-of-non-refoulement-obligations-under-internationalhuman-rights-law/ (discussing an HRCtee decision on the right to life).
143 JAMES PATRICK GRIFFIN, ON HUMAN RIGHTS, 177 (Oxford Univ. Press 2008).
144 Adelman, supra note 73, at 173.
145 Benoı̂t Mayer, International Law and Climate Migrants: A Human Rights Perspective 7 (Sustainable Dev. Law on Climate Change, Legal Working Paper No. 08, 2011).
146 Kweku Assan, supra note 98, at 1050.
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tion of their governments;147 self-evidently, said protection is inexistent whenever the State is not independent, resourceful, or capable enough to effectively
patrol neoliberal excesses of the private sector in the realms of both prevention
strategies and due punishment.
Coming back to the business and human rights Treaty scrutinized in this work,
Article 4(1) of the Zero Draft had included the populations above among the
scope of ‘victims,’ defined as “persons who individually or collectively alleged
to have suffered harm, including physical or mental injury, emotional suffering,
economic loss or substantial impairment of their human rights, including environmental rights, through acts or omissions in the context of business activities
of a transnational character.”148 What remained unclear was whether, in the context of an environmentally induced migration for the aforementioned reasons,
entire families would have been granted comparable standards of redress; the
same Article suggested it was to be assessed “in accordance with domestic law.”
Such a redress was phrased as “[r]estitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition” and, in the context of ecologic restoration, it included the “covering of expenses for relocation of victims.”149 This
tangle was partly solved with the Revised Draft: its Article 1(1) specified that
“the term ‘victim’ also includes the immediate family or dependents of the direct
victim,” but it still maintained this should have been pursued “where appropriate,
in accordance with domestic law” (which could be silent on the subject). The
latest draft’s Article 1(1) no longer retains the domestic-law qualification.
Another potential innovation the Treaty offers can be traced to the increased
scope of due diligence. Environmental due diligence is usually framed in climatechange terms, such that especially major emitters should contribute to reversing
or at least delaying climate change;150 and yet, the general prism of climate
change proves a useless lens through which to view the many ‘environmental’
migrations triggered by specific corporate abuses. In fact, the Third Revised
Draft’s understanding of due diligence151 is commendably comprehensive. As a
minimum, businesses must undertake, publicize and act upon the results of impact assessment studies focused on both the environment and human rights, and
147 Joanna Apap, Eur. Parl Rsch. Serv., Commission Briefing on The Concept of “Climate Refugee:”
Towards a Possible Definition, at 5, PE 621.893 (Feb. 2019).
148 Zero Draft, supra note 37, at art. 4(1) (emphasis added).
149 Id. at art. 8.1(b).
150 See generally Chiara Macchi, The Climate Change Dimension of Business and Human Rights: The
Gradual Consolidation of a Concept of “Climate Due Diligence,” 6 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J., no. 1, 2021, at
93 (reviewing litigation related to the development of ‘climate due diligence’).
151 International law doctrine addresses ‘due diligence’ in either a narrowly legal or a broadly policy
manner; in this case, we refer to the term as a component of a legal obligation stemming from a primary
rule of international law. On the distinction between due diligence in legal versus policy terms, see Neil
McDonald, The Role of Due Diligence in International Law, 68 INT’L & COMPAR. L.Q. 1041, 1054
(2019). For a scrutiny of due diligence in the field of B&HR, see generally Jonathan Bonnitcha & Robert
McCorquodale, The Concept of ‘Due Diligence’ in the U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and Human
Rights, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 899, 899 (2017). Notably, the E.U. (namely the European Parliament) is
developing normative proposals—still at an embryonic stage—for mandatory environmental due diligence TNCs must perform throughout their entire supply-chain; see Ionel Zamfir, Eur. Parl. Rsch. Serv.,
Towards a Mandatory EU System of Due Diligence for Supply Chains at 3, 7-8, PE 659.299 (Oct. 2020).
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the duty is extended to companies with which they entertain any contractual relationships.152 These assessments will later prove fundamental, from an evidentiary
prospective, for separating specific corporate culprits from more general environmental trends bearing on a land, especially after the HRCtee clarified in Teitiota
v. New Zealand153 that, “in the climate [. . .] context, [. . .] foreseeability rather
than imminence of harm, is the key test.”154 Moreover, businesses would carry
out preventative talks with potentially affected groups, attaching particular importance to the claims of vulnerable population segments, including all types of
potential migrants.155 Similar attention must be paid to comparable groups when
it comes to the implementation of the whole text.156 Further definition of ‘restitution,’ ‘compensation,’ and so forth, remains in progress. However, I believe it
would be appropriate if the drafters included a mobility scheme to reassign the
displaced worker (not necessarily formerly employed by the displacing corporation, though a fortiori in that case) within the supply chain of which the polluting
company is part. In this case, and if that re-assignment takes place in a different
jurisdiction (cross-border relocation), the State should intervene only for visa
purposes for workers (and their families). One crucial aspect of these relocations
is that families in developing countries who can ‘place’ one member abroad for
working purposes may cope more proficiently and resiliently with environmental
distress, thanks to remittances they receive from abroad.157 Arguably, the same
reasoning can be extended to actual environmental disasters, but only to the extent that the environment is not so compromised that the rest of the family might
be forced to emigrate as well.
In my view, a supply chain-distributed reassignment calls for a radical paradigm shift. To posit an example, in Europe, “employment-based admissions into
EU Member States are generally based on the labour market needs of the receiving Member State, and not on the situation of the home country.”158 The same
holds true in the United States.159 In a market where “the most vulnerable com152

Third Revised Draft, supra note 19 arts. 6(3)(a), 6(4)(a) & (e-f).
U.N. Hum. Rts. Comm., U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/127/D/2728/2016 (Jan. 7, 2020).
154 Başak Çali et al., Hard Protection Through Soft Courts? Non-Refoulement Before the United Nations Treaty Bodies, 21 GER. L.J. 355, 382 (2020); see also Simon Behrman & Avidan Kent, The Teitiota
Case and the Limitations of the Human Rights Framework, 75 QUESTIONS INT’L L. 25, 36-37 (2020);
Vernon Rive, Is an Enhanced Non-Refoulement Regime Under the ICCPR the Answer to Climate
Change-Related Human Mobility Challenges in the Pacific? Reflections on Teitiota v. New Zealand in
the Human Rights Committee, 75 QUESTIONS INT’L L. 7, 8-9, 17 (2020).
155 Third Revised Draft, supra note 19, at art. 6(4)(c). The same intersectional logic of vulnerability is
applied to migrants with reference to the International Fund that State parties shall establish to help
victims financially, see id. at art.15(7).
156 Second Revised Draft, art. 16(4) and relevant preambulatory provision; Third Revised Draft, supra
note 19, at PP13.
157 See Mostafa Mahmud Naser et al., Climate Change, Migration and Human Rights in Bangladesh:
Perspectives on Governance, 60 ASIA PACIFIC VIEWPOINT 175, 182-83 (2019).
158 Nicole de Moor, International Migration and Environmental Change: Legal Frameworks for International Adaptive Migration 362 (2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Ghent University) (on file with
author).
159 Cf. Alessandra Casella & Adam B. Cox, A Property Rights Approach to Temporary Work Visas,
47 J. LEGAL STUD. 195, 227 (2018).
153
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munities often have difficulties to fulfil the conditions to apply for labor migration visa and work permits, given that most labor migration programs focus on
higher qualified workers,”160 companies of the Global North—where no State
has signed the International Convention on the Rights of Migrant Workers161—
must be made responsible and held accountable for the environmental damage
they themselves create in the Global South through their subsidiaries, or by
means of networked contractual relationships they enable.162 State-owned companies should by definition be required to never leave displaced workers without
employment guaranteeing their survival. They should sponsor either visas (in the
destination countries) or insurance schemes (in the jurisdiction of displacement)
covering environmental disasters, and lobby for personal income tax relief163 on
behalf of the affected employees. Former employees should be granted at least
the same standard of living (wage and services) they enjoyed prior to their displacement caused by irresponsible corporate behavior (often carried out overseas
in the developing world). Referring again to the EU context, it has been noted
that the “establishment or extension of labour migration schemes would be a
promising policy option to respond to slow-onset environmental change when
migration cannot be characterized as forced migration,”164 and one may well subscribe generally to this statement, as it is applicable far beyond Europe. Lamentably, at the time when the EU’s Directive on Subsidiary Protection165 was
conceived, “consideration was also given as to whether certain environmental
[. . .] triggers might justify subsidiary protection. Ultimately, the decision to restrict the Directive to simply harmonizing existing concepts and methods [. . .]
means that it does not create a new system of protection per se, but rather distils
State practice [as] [. . .] an instrument of compromise.”166 Moreover, remittances
to family members who could not leave their original land due to severe illness et
similia should be untaxed.

160

de Moor, supra note 158, at 361.

161

See Martin, supra note 2, at 404; see also Euan MacDonald & Ryszard Cholewinski, U.N. Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), The Migrant Workers Convention in Europe:
Obstacles to the Ratification of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families: EU/EEA Perspectives, 1 UNESCO MIGRATION STUD. 1,
19 (2007); Juhani Lonnroth, The International Convention on the Rights of All Migrant Workers and
Members of Their Families in the Context of International Migration Policies: An Analysis of Ten Years
of Negotiation, 25 INT’L MIGRATION REV. 710 (1991).
162

See generally MUZAFFER EROǦLU, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
COMPARATIVE EXAMINATION (2008).
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TORT LIABILITIES: AN IN-
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163 Or, depending on the formulation of the law, provide tax waivers / exemptions / credits / breaks /
rebates.
164 Albert Kraler et al., Eur. Parl. Directorate Gen’l for Internal Pol’ys, “Climate Refugees” Legal and
Policy Responses to Environmentally Induced Migration, at 66, PE 462.422 (2011).
165 Directive 2011/95/EU on “Standards for the Qualification of Third-Country Nationals or Stateless
Persons as Beneficiaries of International Protection, for a Uniform Status for Refugees or for Persons
Eligible for Subsidiary Protection, and for the Content of the Protection Granted,” 2011 O.J. (L 337).
166 JANE MCADAM, COMPLEMENTARY PROTECTION
Univ. Press 2007).
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Unfortunately, the initial consensus among those drafting the Treaty on access
to information and diplomatic assistance167 may be vanishing168 although it was
temporarily kept in the text;169 regrettably, the latest version170 only retains access to information, while diplomatic assistance is no longer mentioned. As per
current international refugee law (according to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and part of the doctrine), although the burden of
proof rests on the applicant, documentary evidence is supposed to suffice for the
recognition of refugee status even when such applicant provides false or contradictory statements.171 Obviously, this view reflects neither the position nor the
actual practices of most States. When it comes to civil and criminal liability of
corporations, however, standards of proof are much stricter: “victims often face
obstacles when seeking to access justice, such as difficulties encountered when
trying to prove a causal link between the acts of businesses within a supply chain
and damage suffered.”172 Most, however, are only in the position to prove correlation at best. Hence, the road towards demonstrating corporate persecution is
bumpier. This multiplies and intersects with the already-problematic multicausality of any ‘environmental’ migration,173 and also resonates with causation-related
bars that various domestic courts have raised in climate change litigation against
private actors such as major fossil fuel companies.174
V.

Finally Acknowledging ‘Non-state’ Forms of Persecution?

A query for the terms ‘persecution’ and ‘persecuted’ in all issues of the reputable Business and Human Rights Journal returns a total of only four results,175 all
of which relate to classical security affairs and not at all to the environment.
Regrettably, this is hardly surprising. “The issue of environmental degradation as
a determinant of human mobility is part of various legal regimes that the international legal community has so far been treating with an unconnected logic,”176
exacerbated by its own multicausality. Hence, the core argument of the present
analysis is that non-State acts of persecution will never meet the standards under
PIL to prove state-mandated persecution unless all three elements (migratory,
167

Zero Draft, supra note 37, at art. 8(9); Revised Draft, supra note 38, at art. 4(6-7).
Fourth Session, Draft Rep., supra note 136, at ¶ 41.
169 Second Revised Draft, supra note 39, at arts. 4(2)(f-g), 7(2), 7(3)(a).
170 Third Revised Draft, supra note 19, at arts. 4(2)(f), 7(2), 12(3).
171 Jahid Hossain Bhuiyan, Refugee Status Determination: Analysis and Application, in AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW 37, 61 (Rafiqul Islam & Jahid Hossain Bhuiyan eds., 2013).
172 Fourth Session, Draft Rep., supra note 136, at ¶ 34. As applied to international law in general, see
RODA VERHEYEN, CLIMATE CHANGE DAMAGE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW: PREVENTION DUTIES AND
STATE RESPONSIBILITY 251 (2005); see also Benoı̂t Mayer, State Responsibility and Climate Change
Governance: A Light Through the Storm, 13 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 539, 550 (2014).
173 Benoı̂t Mayer, et al., Governing Environmentally-Related Migration in Bangladesh: Responsibilities, Security and the Causality Problem, 22 ASIAN PACIFIC MIGRATION J. 177, 188-191 (2013).
174 Geetanjali Ganguly et al., If at First You Don’t Succeed: Suing Corporations for Climate Change,
38 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 841, 849, 855-858 (2018).
175 As of Sept. 24, 2021.
176 Fornalé & Kagan, supra note 104, at 5.
168
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environmental, and corporate) are given due legal weight and addressed together.
Otherwise, no one of them alone will ever suffice to recognize persecution in the
particular situations I address here. In other words, the international community
will never overcome its current inaction on such a multidisciplinary dossier, unless and until it completely reverts to considering the State in its broader contemporary scope and power struggles, starting with the role played by key ‘nonState’ actors like corporations. If the latter are State-owned, a stronger claim can
be made that, when their polluting or exploitative operations force people to vacate their land, such “persecution is a government act against individuals and
climate migrants are [. . .] forced to flee for environmental and political reasons.
Many government policies can have consequences leading to natural disasters,
putting certain groups of people at great risks.”177 Besides the 1969 OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa and the
1984 Cartagena Declaration in Latin America, a strong analogy can be drawn to
human rights doctrine by referring to the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid (1973), where persecution is
considered “in terms of reasons, interests, and policy measures.”178 That governments, because of ‘their’ non-governmental actors may be accepted as persecutors, is not to be taken for granted:179 “U.S. law has readily accepted that harm or
threats from non-State actors can give rise to a valid basis for asylum,” but until
recently, the same was not accepted in Europe.180 One should advocate for this
progressive stance to be codified within all legal systems. The 1998 GPID themselves, especially Principles 2 and 5, make no distinction among actors.181 Further, the Principles are becoming increasingly accepted182 – if not yet
177 Bhuiyan, supra note 171, at 222. It is worth noting this HRCtee comment on the subject matter,
see U.N. HRCtee, General Comment No. 31 (2018) on The Nature of the General Legal Obligation
Imposed on States Parties to the [ICCPR], ¶¶ 8, 9, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 1326 (May 2004)
(providing that “the positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights will only be fully
discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against violations of Covenant rights by its
agents, but also against acts committed by private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of
Covenant rights’ (¶ 8). The same Comment specifies that ‘[t]he fact that the competence of the Committee to receive and consider communications is restricted to those submitted by or on behalf of individuals
[. . .] does not prevent such individuals from claiming that actions or omissions that concern legal persons
and similar entities amount to a violation of their own rights’ (¶ 9)); compare ROBERT ESSER, PROCEDURAL ENVIRONMENTAL RIGHTS IN THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND
THEIR IMPACT ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW 61, 64 (Jerzy Jendrośka & Magdalena Bar, eds., 2018)
(noting the European Court of Human Rights imposes upon a State the affirmative duty to take preventative steps to protect the lives of those within their jurisdiction).
178 GUY S. GOODWIN-GILL, THE REFUGEE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 78 (Clarendon, 2d ed. 1996) (emphasis added).
179 Sumudu Anopama Atapattu, Climate Change, Human Rights, and Forced Migration: Implications
for International Law, 27 WIS. INT’L L.J. 607, 621-622 (2010) (“For example, the Ogoni people of
Nigeria were specifically targeted as a group by the Nigerian government. Thus, they may have been
able to fulfill the criteria for a refugee in the Refugee Convention because they were subject to repression
as well as being subjected to environmental hazards caused by the Nigerian government and the Shell oil
company. However, this will not be the case in many other instances.”) (emphasis added).
180 DAVID A. MARTIN ET AL., FORCED MIGRATION LAW AND POLICY 161-164 (West Academic, 2d ed.
2013).
181 Walter Kälin, Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement: Annotations, 38 STUD. TRANSNAT’L
LEGAL POL’Y 1, 15-16; 25 (American Society of International Law 2008).
182 Martin, supra note 2, at 412.
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‘customary’ due to the ICJ-crafted “most affected” and “proximity” criteria for
State practice;183 however, addressing States’ opinio remains problematic.184 At
any rate, the GPID have been incorporated in national legislation and cited judicially, in addition to their de facto incorporation into the Kampala Convention,185
thus they are arguably undergoing their lengthy “hardening” process.186
Complicit in operations throughout globalized, complex, and tangled supply
chains, and concerned with regulating migratory inflows more than outflows,187
States that host such businesses (i.e., the siège social of the latter’s ‘parent companies’) frequently become the new persecutors. When they pollute the environment and imperil their workers’ health, the resulting environmental migrants are
“not escaping [their] own government. [They] would be seeking refuge in the
[S]tates that actually contribute to [polluting their environment], which means
fleeing towards the persecutor. This de-linking of the persecutor from the [‘sending State’] is accordingly unknown to current international refugee law,”188
which creates “a complete reversal of the refugee paradigm”189 and the most
nonsensical contradictions of globalization.190 Nonetheless, B&HR is not the
only stream of scholarly discourse one should peruse in order to grasp this phenomenon; international economic law, paradoxically, serves a similar end (thanks
to, e.g., the World Trade Organization’s ‘environmental exception’ clause,191 and
more widely, to trade liberalization).192 Others point to the U.N. Convention
Against Torture as a model, since it “provides a good balance between affirmative obligations for [S]tates and the rights the [C]onvention grants to
individuals.”193
183 As per International Court of Justice (ICJ) authoritative case law, State practice must be consistent
and widespread, but also relevant. On these doctrines, see, e.g., Kevin Jon Heller, Specially-Affected
States and the Formation of Custom, 112 AM. J. INT’L L. 191 (2018).
184 Opinio iuris is one of the two elements for ascertaining the claimed validity of an international
custom. For its broader relevance in the international law of disaster-prevention, see Anne Sophia-Marie
van Aaken, Is International Law Conducive to Preventing Looming Disasters?, 7 GLOB. POL’Y 81, 82
(2016).
185 As the region contemplated by the Kampala Agreement was particularly prone to phenomena
creating internal displacement, those using the Principles there customized and implemented them with
enhanced “probative value.” See generally Kampala Convention, supra note 29.
186 Sandesh Sivakumaran, Techniques in International Law-Making: Extrapolation, Analogy, Form
and the Emergence of an International Law of Disaster Relief, 28 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1097, 1126-27 (2018).
187

MIGRATION AND GLOBAL GOVERNANCE xiii, xvi (Alan Gamlen & Katharine Marsh, eds., 2011).

188

Louise Olsson, Environmental Migrants in International Law: An Assessment of Protection Gaps
and Solutions 13 (2015) (unpublished B.A. thesis, Örebro University).
189 Jane McAdam, From Economic Refugees to Climate Refugees?, 10 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 579,
592 (2009) (reviewing MICHELLE FOSTER, INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW AND SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS:
REFUGE FROM DEPRIVATION (2007)).
190 In other words, migrants in this situation flee from their own State to the State of incorporation of
the ‘parent company,’ and in doing so are not running from their own government per se, but rather
seeking refuge in the state of persecution.
191

Daszkiewicz, supra note 103, at 98-99, 102.

192

Fornalé & Kagan, supra note 104, at 3.

193

Atapattu, supra note 179, at 631.
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In sum, it is beneficial to dissect the long-lasting ‘climate refugee’ dilemma in
multiple regimes only as a first step, both to identify and comprehensively address the multidimensional legal landscape, and to ensure that necessary State
and international institutional capacity-building occur. However, the second step
must involve a complete scrutiny of the root meaning and overall substance of
‘persecution.’ In fact, even in the case that protection was expanded under a legal
instrument such as the 1951 [U.N. Refugee] Convention to include “climate refugees,” the institutions that currently address asylum issues would not be sufficiently equipped to manage the issue. Worldwide numerous national, regional,
and international systems exist to address the humanitarian and other aspects related to natural hazards, both rapid- and slow-onset.194
For example, the African Kampala Convention “re-conceptualiz[es . . . S]tate
sovereignty as responsibility to protect,”195 such that States “must not only protect people against arbitrary displacement, but ensure accountability of persons,
groups and non-State actors (including multinational companies and private military [contractors] or security companies) responsible for arbitrary displacement
as well.”196 So, what would the added value of this binding Treaty be for Africa
in this specific respect? It might concern prescriptive jurisdiction, although it is
not defined in either instrument.197 Certainly, however, it involves adjudicative
jurisdiction: Article 4(8) of the Revised Draft and Article 7(1) of the Second
Revised Draft seemed to evoke the forum necessitatis (jurisdiction by necessity)
doctrine,198 whose importance for the accountability of TNCs for their environmental abuses has already been examined in legal scholarship.199 The latest draft
fails to mention any ‘necessary’ jurisdiction, though a limited formulation of forum necessitatis remains in the text.200
194

Warner, supra note 65, at 3.

195

Mehari Taddele Maru, The Kampala Convention and Its Contribution in Filling the Protection
Gap in International Law, 1 J. INTERNAL DISPLACEMENT 91, 126 (2011).
196 Ruth Delbaere, Internally Displaced Persons in the African Human Rights System: An Analysis of
the Kampala Convention 41 (2011) (LL.M Dissertation, Universiteit Gent) (emphasis added).
197 Compare Kampala Convention, supra note 29, at art. 5(1) (“within their territory or jurisdiction”),
with Revised Draft, supra note 38, preamble (“within their territory or otherwise under their jurisdiction
or control”). If jurisdiction is already extraterritorial (i.e., something other than ‘territory’ as contemplated by the language, ‘or otherwise. . .’), what is the difference between said extraterritorial jurisdiction
and the ‘control?’ But see Revised Draft, id., at art. 5(1) (language matches that of the Kampala Convention). Compare Second Revised Draft, supra note 38 (drafters use the phrasing, “within their territory or
jurisdiction,’ throughout the document) with Third Revised Draft, supra note 19, at arts. 6(1), (6)2, 6(6),
8(1) (language used is now “territory, jurisdiction, or otherwise under their control”).
198 Revised Draft, supra note 38, at art. 4(8) (“State Parties shall provide their domestic judicial and
other competent authorities with the necessary jurisdiction”) (emphasis added); Second Revised Draft,
supra note 39, at art. 7(1) (“States [sic] Parties shall provide their courts and State-based non-judicial
mechanisms, with the necessary jurisdiction in accordance with this [treaty]”) emphasis added). Arguably, a Court’s competence over a case is decided by the Court itself (Kompetenz-Kompetenz doctrine),
not by the State to which it belongs.
199 See Chilenye Nwapi, Jurisdiction by Necessity and the Regulation of the Transnational Corporate
Actor, 30 UTRECHT J. INT’L & EUR. L. 24 (2014).
200 Third Revised Draft, supra note 19, at arts. 9(4), 9(5); see also id. at art. 9(1) (refer to the “without
prejudice” formula, i.e., assignment of jurisdiction regardless of a victim’s “nationality or place of
domicile”).
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VI.

Any added value?

In an era of increasing globalization, the Treaty will fill a gap in existing
options. “While it is important to design international [. . .] instruments to protect
climate refugees, another effective approach may be to prevent them [from] leaving their place of residence by implementing agricultural innovations to stimulate
economic growth and reduce environmental degradation;” however, although
“[t]he boosting of the outsourcing potential of a country by its acting as broker
between local companies and foreign partners who intend to invest in the country
is an important means of enhancing innovation within a developing country,”201
the draft Treaty is currently silent in these respects. One might suggest, therefore,
that in order to do their due diligence to prevent and control potential damage,
companies should take it upon themselves to provide financial or bureaucratic
support to legitimate voluntary (that is, not yet strictly necessary) migration,
which “can lessen the risk of displacement by reducing exposure to climate
hazards, and is therefore a contribution to individual and societal adaptation.”202
Though this runs contrary to the trend—already existent in climate change practices—of denying “protection for those who flee in anticipation of future [. . .]
harms,”203 the evidence in fact shows that voluntary migration is more beneficial
than involuntary migration, both for sending and for receiving communities.204 In
terms of finance, it is less disruptive, less risky, and easier to manage carefully
for all parties involved. The financial burden arising from displacement caused
by negligent or criminal business conduct impacting workers’, customers’, and
clients’ environments should similarly shift to large companies (particularly effective during peacetime). Shifting this financial burden would at least somewhat
relieve developing States from the difficult burden they bear205 to implement the
and promote the GPID in national policy, legislation, and practice. As one
scholar notes, to-date “no country has fully implemented the [GPID]. Even when
they are incorporated into national laws and policies, the almost exclusive focus
has been [to help] those displaced by conflict.”206
As noted supra, public authorities may choose to change internal process reactions to business-induced, environmentally-caused internal displacement with re201 Lotte Geboers, Matijn Straatsma & Ayşe Wijmenga, Protecting and Preventing Climate Refugees:
An Interdisciplinary Study on Climate Refugee Issues and the United Nations 30, 40 (2017) (unpublished
interdisciplinary thesis, Utrecht University).
202 Emily Wilkinson, et al., Overseas Dev. Inst., Climate-Induced Migration and Displacement: Closing the Policy Gap 4 (ODI 2016); see also Koko Warner & Tamer Afifi, Where the Rain Falls: Evidence
from Eight Countries on How Vulnerable Households Use Migration to Manage the Risk of Rainfall
Variability and Food Security, 6 CLIMATE & DEV. 1, 11 (2014).
203 Climate Change Justice and Human Rights Task Force, International Bar Association, Achieving
Justice and Human Rights in an Era of Climate Disruption 90 (2014), https://www.ibanet.org/PresidentialTaskForceClimateChangeJustice2014Report.aspx.
204 Daszkiewicz, supra note 103, at 99.
205 Flautre, et al., The Greens/EFA in the Eur. Parl., Position Paper on Climate Change, Refugees and
Migration 7 (2013), https://europeangreens.eu/sites/europeangreens.eu/files/news/files/Greens%20EFA
%20-%20Position%20Paper%20-%20Climate%20Change%20Refugees%20and%20Migration.pdf.
206 Elizabeth G. Ferris & Jonas Bergmann, Soft Law, Migration and Climate Change Governance, 8 J.
HUM. RTS. & ENV’T 6, 15 (2017).
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gard to their visa policies. For instance, they may decide to promptly turn
working visas into regular or general ones if foreign individuals’ inability to
work is a result of health issues caused by environmental degradation. Relatedly,
foreign workers often return to their original countries or seek employment in a
third country anyways, but those who are unwilling to do so because of family
ties in loco or other personal reasons should not be forced to relocate,207 especially not when given unreasonably short deportation notice. This holds true for
both seasonal and non-seasonal industries, and extends to displaced workers’
families or even, in some legal systems and traditions, to entire working communities.208 Further, we may uncover a hidden normative resonance between the
pending Treaty and the primary legal source for the protection of migrants, the
1951 Refugee Convention in considering protection for migrants’ families,
because
. . . four of the protected groups enumerated in the Refugee Convention—
race, religion, nationality, and political opinion—reflect the core categories recognized in other instruments. The fifth group—membership of a
particular social group [MPSG]—is a flexible ground that can encompass
similar protections as those found in other areas of international law. Domestic jurisprudence shows that MPSG may be used for categories that
are less prevalent in international instruments, [. . .] and may go further
than other instruments, such as recognizing family as a PSG.209

Thus, if exploited workers are recognized as ‘persecuted’ under the new
Treaty, their families will be protected accordingly thanks to this MPSG criterion. In addition, the right to family life in the best interest of the child rises to
prominence in the context of selective relocation, because “[w]hen separated
from their families, internally displaced children are at greater risk of exploitative
labor. . .”210 with cascading effects on social capital as a whole.211 This visa
extension may stand as a form of “[r]estitution, compensation, rehabilitation, rep207

Sonja Starr & Lea Brilmayer, Family Separation as a Violation of International Law, 21 BERKEJ. INT’L L. 213, 278, 282 (2003) (under international law, even in emergency circumstances, States
“must refrain from forcibly separating families and work toward the reunification of those that have been
separated.”).
208 For instance, in the case of therapeutic communities, for whom continued cohabitation is especially vital when disasters materialize. See Darragh Farrell, The Role of Therapeutic Communities in the
Process of Desistance: A Figurational Analysis 8 (2019) (unpublished MA Dissertation in Criminology,
Technological University of Dublin) (“[t]herapeutic communities are working communities where residents have jobs, responsibilities, and constant interaction with each other[, and where] social capital
also develops as a by-product of daily life within a therapeutic community. This organically occurring
form of social capital is likely to become the blueprint for building informal relationships beyond the
therapeutic community, and as such, is vital to sustained desistance and recovery.”). See also Apostolos
Andrikopoulos & Jan Willem Duyvendak, Migration, Mobility and the Dynamics of Kinship: New Barriers, New Assemblages, in ETHNOGRAPHY 299 (2020); Adriana M. Reyes, The Economic Organization of
Extended Family Households by Race or Ethnicity and Socioeconomic Status, 80 J. MARRIAGE & FAM.
119 (2017).
209 Joseph Rikhof & Ashley Geerts, Protected Groups in Refugee Law and International Law, 8 LAWS
1, 26 (2019); see generally 1951 U.N. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Apr. 22, 1954, 189
U.N.T.S. 137.
210 CATHERINE PHUONG, THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS 146
(2004).
LEY
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aration, [and] satisfaction”212 that victims would be entitled to under the new
regime: the formulation is vague, which is exactly why calls have been issued to
clarify its scope.213
When workers’ relocation is unavoidable (and, importantly, the criteria of relocation must be strictly transparent and independently evaluated),214 States
should provide those affected with “[e]nvironmental remediation and ecological
restoration where applicable, including covering of expenses for relocation of
victims and replacement of community facilities.”215 Indeed, the restoration of
livelihood is far more urgent than monetary compensation per se.216 Cases like
that of the Narmada River Dam in India217 remind us of the importance of international treaty-based supervision over direct expropriation performed by States.
This is particularly critical when businesses or other profit-oriented projects ruin
delicate human-environment interactions within complex ecosystems, in turn
forcing resettlement and affecting or destroying the societies that built their lifestyle, cultural uniqueness, and intangible heritage218 upon and around those equilibria.219 Such a provision on compensation for relocation may even be deemed
ground-breaking. Looking for instance at alien tort claims (ATS) case law,
claims are rejected not because they fail to uphold discriminatory expropriation
as unlawful under customary international law, but because they fail to demonstrate they do not challenge a state actor as a defendant.220 Under the new
Treaty, the cause for concern on this point might be relieved, as the Treaty could
encourage States to oversee expropriative decisions enforced by non-State actors.
211 Olivia Dun, Agricultural Change, Increasing Salinisation and Migration in the Mekong Delta:
Insights for Potential Future Climate Change Impacts?, in CLIMATE CHANGE, MIGRATION, AND HUMAN
SECURITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA, 84, 96 (2012).
212 Third Revised Draft, supra note 19, at art. 4(2)(c).
213 Fourth Session, Draft Rep., supra note 136, at ¶ 42.
214 Fornalé & Kagan, supra note 104, at 40.
215 See Revised Draft, supra note 38, at art. 4(5)(b) (regrettably, the negotiators removed from the
Second and Third Revised Drafts any reference to the ‘covering of expenses for relocation of victims and
replacement of community facilities.’); but see Third Revised Draft, supra note 19, at Art.4(2)(c) (retaining ‘environmental remediation, and ecological restoration’); but compare Fourth Session, Draft Rep.,
supra note 136, at ¶ 42 (showing some delegation and business opposition to retaining even this
language).
216 See Onome Lisa Ejenavi, Sustaining Oil Exploration and Exploitation in the Emerging Context of
Sustainable Development: The Case of the Niger Delta 251, 258 (2018) (unpublished PhD Thesis, Lancaster University)
217 Cohan, supra note 86, at 144.
218 See Riccardo Vecellio Segate, Protecting Cultural Heritage by Recourse to International Environmental Law: Chinese Stances on Faultless State Liability, 27 HASTINGS ENVTL. L.J. 153, 161-79 (2021);
Patrick Toussaint, Loss and Damage and Climate Litigation: The Case for Greater Interlinkage, 30 REV.
EUR. COMPAR. & INT’L ENVTL. L. 16, 23 (2021).
219 See also Margaretha Wewerinke-Singh, A Right to Enjoy Culture in Face of Climate Change:
Implications for “Climate Migrants” (2013) (CGHR Working Paper No. 6 / 4CMR Working Paper No. 7,
University of Cambridge); Margaretha Wewerinke-Singh & Tess van Geelen, Protection of Climate Displaced Persons Under International Law: A Case Study from Mataso Island, Vanuat, 19 MELBOURNE J.
INT’L L. 666, 700-701 (2018).
220 Sarah M. Morris, The Intersection of Equal and Environmental Protection: A New Direction for
Environmental Alien Tort Claims After Sarei and Sosa, 41 COLUMBIA HUM. RTS. L. REV. 275, 336-37
(2009).
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Nevertheless, in contrast to the burden-sharing rationale applicable to States upon
which international agreements on climate change and industrial emissions are
based,221 this Treaty would not apply retroactively to private actors.222 The foundational, unsolved problem remains where to place the threshold between corporate behaviors as primary pull factors and, instead, as circumstantial, tangential
co-causes which should not bear all the blame. This issue shapes the discourse
that tries to distinguish between (‘environmental’) migrants and (‘environmental’) refugees; however, the Treaty negotiators have yet to provide a legal solution to help draw that distinction.
Another gap that needs to be filled concerns how binding principles like the
“no-harm” or the “precautionary” principles—seemingly accepted as customary
international law in scholarly discourse despite minimal authoritative and general judicial say on the matter—are on corporations,223 and even on States themselves.224 In fact, if a corporation located in State A pollutes the ecosystem of
State B and forces State B’s population to move, the rights of the latter may stand
as better clarified under the upcoming B&HR regime rather than by established
environmental legal governance, and this new Treaty may make such a corporation itself accountable before the judiciary of either country (needless to say, this
would only be applicable if both A and B have ratified the Treaty). As a result,
three concurrent solutions may provide a satisfactory alternative to the current
state of affairs: global binding treaties on emission reductions and similar measures; the enhanced national implementation of the GPID and enforcement of the
relevant regional arrangements; and finally, the protections ensured by the forthcoming Treaty over those who are affected by irresponsible corporate actions
affecting the environment and its inhabitants (among whom indigenous commu221 See Mariya Gromilova, Legal Protection of the People at Risk of Climate-Induced Cross-Border
Displacement: Application of the 1951 Refugee Convention 35 (2011) (Paper No. 158406, unpublished
MA Thesis,Tilburg University); see also Joseph E. Aldy & William A. Pizer, Alternative Metrics for
Comparing Domestic Climate Change Mitigation Efforts and the Emerging International Climate Policy
Architecture, 10 REV. OF ENVTL. ECONS. & POL’Y 3, 6 (2015); Lucas Bretschger, Climate Policy and
Equity Principles: Fair Burden Sharing in a Dynamic World, 18 ENV’T & DEV. ECON. 517 (2013). For
context, see OLIVIER GODARD, GLOBAL CLIMATE JUSTICE: PROPOSALS, ARGUMENTS AND JUSTIFICATION
56–84 (2017).
222 This may prove problematic. See, e.g., Kristian Høyer Toft, Climate Change as a Business and
Human Rights Issue: A Proposal for a Moral Typology, 5 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 1, 4, 18 (2019) (in the
context of climate change, some academics contended that “corporations have backward-looking human
rights duties to remedy harms from climate change to which they have contributed, but also forwardlooking responsibilities to prevent negative impacts on human rights from climate change[, pursuant to] a
more relational understanding of responsibility than the individualist one enshrined in the liability model
of tort law.”).
223 Sandrine Maljean-Dubois & Vanessa Richard, The Applicability of International Environmental
Law to Private Enterprises, in HARNESSING FOREIGN INVESTMENT TO PROMOTE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION INCENTIVES AND SAFEGUARDS 69, 74 (Pierre-Marie Dupuy & Jorge E. Viñuales eds., 2013)
(Nonetheless, “binding law (treaty and customary rules) has only a limited normative power because its
incidence is indirect, whereas softer normative incentives [may] have a very direct influence on the
behaviour of enterprises.”).
224 Jutta Brunnée & Ellen Hey, International Environmental Law: Mapping the Field, in OXFORD
HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 2, 9 (Daniel Bodansky et al., eds., 2008) (For
instance, “[a]lthough the no-harm principle has, by now, achieved canonical status, in practice, it is not
consistently applied to resolve specific environmental disputes by courts or tribunals.”).
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nities are particularly vulnerable).225 Thus, the new Treaty should not be conceived as an instrument to replace current arrangements, but rather as one that
may fill existing gaps.226 Yet, for it to be beneficial, negotiators must first solve
the abovementioned ‘threshold issue’ as to allocation of blame. Optimistically,
the combined effect of many negotiators’ suggestions227 in forthcoming drafts
should address these shortcomings.
VII.

Heading Towards a Resolutive New Treaty?

The initial observation underpinning the present analysis was that most occurrences of internal displacement or cross-border migration triggered by soil degradation, water scarcity, air pollution, and similar factors are usually labelled as
‘environmental,’ allowing us to simply categorize the problem as the inevitable
fate of a territory’s population or, at best, to general phenomena of climate
change. However, the causes of a not-insignificant portion of these occurrences
can be traced to the irresponsible and possibly criminal behavior of companies—
mostly TNCs’ subsidiaries in developing and least-developed countries—that
shield them from accountability for the pollution and degradation of natural resources and ecosystems their activities cause. It would therefore be more accurate
to re-categorize migration flows and internal displacements as “corporate” rather
than “environmental.”
Regrettably, no universal or regional international law instrument addresses
this problem satisfactorily by combining the three elements of migration, environment, and corporate responsibility. The African Union’s Kampala Convention
marks the only exception to this rule, but its embryonic enforcement record and
the regional scope of its applicability do not provide any general solutions to this
issue. Furthermore, due to corruption, underfunding, weak institutional independence, understaffing, poor rule-of-law standards, and pervasive regulatory capture, the domestic courts of the State where an act of corporate misconduct
225 See also Rocca Salcedo Mesa, Environmental Degradation and Human Rights Abuses: Does the
Refugee Convention Confer Protection to Environmental Refugees?, 10 INT’L L.: REVISTA COLUMBIANA
DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 75, 112-14 (2007).
226 See Hannah L. Buxbaum, Articles by Maurer Faculty (2861), Public Regulation and Private Enforcement in Global Economy: Strategies for Managing Conflict, 399 COLLECTED COURSES 277, 412
(Indiana Univ. Maurer Schl. of L. 2019) (indeed, “multinational enterprises have proved adept at operating in the gaps between legal systems. It is not evident that public regulatory bodies have adequate
resources, or could secure adequate resources, to achieve appropriate levels of prosecution and deterrence
in this climate.”).
227 Among the most relevant suggestions, sorted by order of appearance: the negligent exposure of
children to toxic chemicals, to account for the unfair power imbalance between companies and rightsholders; the two mutually-reinforcing trends of increasing recognition of the indivisibility of human
rights and increasing protection in specialized areas, showcased by national implementation mechanisms;
civil injunction; the primacy of human rights over trade and investment agreements; vexatious litigation;
common but differentiated responsibilities; the inclusion of environmental rights, which would make
“internationally recognized human rights,” as defined in similar treaties, too narrow a framework, thus
truly fulfilling the aspiration to address ‘all human rights;’ the businesses involved (all vs. transnational
and all vs. for-profit); the inclusion of a “right to a sustainable environment” in the Preamble; and precautionary measures against, inter alia, environmental crimes. See Fourth Session, Draft Rep. supra note
136, at ¶¶ 10, 33, 35, 40, 46, 49, 93, 95, 110, 115.
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unfolds—or even where the parent company resides228—are not necessarily the
appropriate vehicle with which to compel TNCs to adjust their business model
and adequately compensate those affected. This holds especially true when the
latter fear violent retaliation229 or have already been forced to flee.
Hence, a uniform, persuasive, and universal instrument of international law
codifying detailed obligations for corporations through their States of incorporation, while simultaneously multiplying potential avenues for redress, is highly
warranted. As international law stands today, this need remains unmet because
migration, environment, and corporate responsibility are never jointly confronted. The migration and refugee legal regime concentrate on traditional security issues such as torture and cruel, inhumane, or degrading treatment or
punishment, as well as surveillance,230 terrorism, warfare, forcible eviction and
transfer, forced relocation, human trafficking, piracy, smuggling, and the like. Its
rhetoric focuses on border control and detention as a manifestation of biopolitical
power,231 while the prism of related international criminal law may offer only
limited recompense.232 This confirms how the exasperating prominence attributed to borders and passports is a founding myth of (post)modernity, as recently
shown quite embarrassingly by a failed State and its pleonastic biometric controls.233 As for the international environmental legal regime, it acts upon climate
change and sea-level rise, transboundary harm, biodiversity preservation and so
forth, or it grapples with ‘natural’ disasters such as droughts or ‘unavoidable’
trends such as the degradation of the soil and consequent food insecurity. Lastly,
228 See, e.g., Don Mayer & Ruth Jebe, The Legal and Ethical Environment for Multinational Corporations, in GOOD BUSINESS: EXERCISING EFFECTIVE AND ETHICAL LEADERSHIP 159, 168-169 (James
O’Toole & Don Mayer eds., 2010).
229 See Gwynne L. Skinner Rethinking Limited Liability of Parent Corporations for Foreign Subsidiaries’ Violations of International Human Rights Law, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1769, 1803 (2015).
230 See Ben Hayes, Migration and Data Protection: Doing No Harm in an Age of Mass Displacement,
Mass Surveillance and “Big Data,” 99 INT’L REV. RED CROSS 179, 187 (2017).
231 “Biopolitics,” an originally Foucauldian concept (though not term) later re-elaborated—most notably—by Agamben, has come to define (in socio-political as well as legal scholarship) a radical application of state-enforced human-life management that, while not necessarily causing the physical death of its
subjects, depowers them up to the barest forms of living through the pervasive, extensive, and capillary
control of their biological functions, expressive potential, and derived cognitive capabilities. See, e.g.,
Miguel De Larrinaga & Marc G. Doucet, Sovereign Power and the Biopolitics of Human Security, 39
SEC. DIALOGUE 517, 520-521 (2008). On border policing and systematic detention of irregular migrants
as expressions of biopolitical power, see Anne Orford, Biopolitics and the Tragic Subject of Human
Rights, in THE LOGICS OF BIOPOWER AND THE WAR ON TERROR: LIVING, DYING, SURVIVING 205, 208211 (Elizabeth Dauphinee & Cristina Masters eds., 2007); Daria Davitti, Biopolitical Borders and the
State of Exception in the European Migration “Crisis,” 29 EUR. J. INT’L L. 1173 (2018); Olga Zeveleva,
Biopolitics, Borders, and Refugee Camps: Exercising Sovereign Power over Non-Members of the State,
45 NATIONALITIES PAPERS 41 (2017); Thilo Wiertz, Biopolitics of Migration: An Assemblage Approach,
39 ENV’T & PLANNING C: POLITICS & SPACE 1375 (SAGE 2020) https://doi.org/
10.1177%2F2399654420941854. On international migration law as the codified management of deprivation, see also Christina Oelgemöller & Kathryn L. Allinson, The Responsible Migrant: Reading the
Global Compact on Migration, 31 L. & CRITIQUE 183, 190 (2020).
232 See, e.g., Donna Minha, The Possibility of Prosecuting Corporations for Climate Crimes Before
the International Criminal Court: All Roads Lead to the Rome Statute?, 41 MICH. J. INT’L L. 491, 521526 (2020).
233 See Ferenc David Markó, We Are Not a Failed State, We Make the Best Passports”: South Sudan
and Biometric Modernity, 59 AFR. STUD. REV., no. 2, 2016, at 113-132.
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B&HR scholars and advocacy groups mostly deal with labor rights and trade
union grievances, modern slavery, the right to development, land grabbing, or the
regulation of mining/extractive industries. Of course, these are all exceedingly
important topics, and it is appropriate and urgent to pursue them under the rubric
of each of these three legal regimes.
However, the issue emphasized here is in fact determining the ‘law-transparent’ under such well-oiled compartmentalization. Hence, there is a pressing need
to conceive of these three legal spheres together and seek a tailored solution to
this problem – a problem which is increasingly costly both for humans and the
environment.
Besides addressing sovereign immunity234 and forum non conveniens235 obstacles, an effective dedicated legal tool should facilitate a solution to several outstanding shortcomings in the current design of international law. The lexicon
conceived for public security (e.g., ‘victim,’ ‘persecution,’ and ‘sending country’) should be replaced by or updated to include comprehensive, multifaceted
terminology created with human security in mind, which would help shift attention away from States and onto corporations, and give citizens bargaining power
with TNCs in cases of local and specific misconduct. Currently, however, challenging corporations on climate change through court processes solves issues of
corporate pollution and contamination only indirectly; that is, on a macro level.
This does not allow for instant, on-the-ground change. An effective instrument
must counter the neo-imperialist hegemony exercised by unaccountable TNCs in
the poorest regions of the globe on a systemic level. Transnational corporations
pollute the land of low-skilled workers in the developing world (sending States),
while in the developed world (receiving States) the same companies lobby only
to ease immigration restrictions for high-skilled, white-collar immigrantion.236
Although at times TNCs do try to share the benefits of their industrial plans with
local populations, most jobs are in fact outsourced,237 and there are entire inhabited areas still lacking electricity while paradoxically being traversed by (spilling)
oil pipes and other private infrastructure.238 These nonsensical arrangements
234 For a doctrinal excursus, see Ranabir Samaddar, The Justice-Seeking Subject, in THE BORDERS OF
JUSTICE 145,148 (Étienne Balibar et al. eds, Temple Univ. Press 2012).
235 See, e.g., Juan Gabriel Auz Vaca, The Environmental Law Dimensions of an International Binding
Treaty on Business and Human Rights, 15 REVISTA DE DIREITO INTERNACIONAL, no. 2, 2018, at 150, 160161, 175.
236 See also Vivienne Born, Getting the Best of Us: Multinational Corporate Networks and the Diffusion of Skill-Selective Immigration Policies (2019) (Unpublished PhD Dissertation, University of Pennsylvania); Nina Glick Schiller, A Global Perspective on Transnational Migration: Theorising Migration
Without Methodological Nationalism, in DIASPORA AND TRANSNATIONALISM: CONCEPTS, THEORIES, AND
METHOD 109, 127 (Rainer Bauböck & Thomas Faist eds., Amsterdam Univ. Press 2010).
237 See Carol Olson and Frank Lenzmann, The Social and Economic Consequences of the Fossil Fuel
Supply Chain, 3 MRS ENERGY & SUSTAINABILITY, no. E6, 2016, at 1, 10.
238 One absurd example is that of Nigeria, where foreign multinationals’ endeavors spoil the local
environment and deplete energy resources to the benefit the country’s ruling élites, most countryside
households’ demands for electricity cannot be satisfied. See, e.g., Michael Watts, Resource Curse?
Governmentality, Oil and Power in the Niger Delta, Nigeria, 9 GEOPOLITICS 50, 67-68 (2004); Sunday
Olayinka Oyedepo, Energy and Sustainable Development in Nigeria: The Way Forward, ENERGY, SUSTAINABILITY & SOC’Y, no. 15, 2012, at 1.
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must end, and aiming the policy narratives and legal tools currently oriented
around ‘environmental’ migrations instead at addressing ruthless corporate misconduct seems like as good a place to start as any.
Under this Treaty, exploitative businesses acts might be brought one step
closer to proximate causation theory allowable for governmental acts, which
would help them fit well-seasoned ‘persecution’ narratives premised on intent.239
Overseeing the unfolding of these negotiations and guarding the outcome is important, as the latter may potentially close one of the gaps in the protection of
‘environmentally’-induced migrations, especially in times of peace. The call for
protecting migrants escaping environmental disasters in wartime240 has gone
mostly unheard, and authoritative scholarship has explained the reasons why a
treaty on these migrations would be unfeasible for the time being.241 Also, corporate exploitation is worse during peacetime when cross-border business operations are not disrupted by belligerent contingencies and diplomatic frictions,
although one should remain wary of potentially deadly cumulative effects in wartime,242 too.
The attainment of long-awaited consensus to the terms of the pending Treaty
would in any case mark an achievement of momentous occasion. For the first
time in history, the dictum that “businesses’ decisions to uphold human rights
standards remain largely voluntary and thus subject to market—rather than
moral—forces”243 may lose its validity on a global scale (depending of course on
the eventual signatories). In fact, international policymakers’ unwillingness to
admit the interrelation between transnational business exploitation, environmental degradation, (transboundary) pollution, global warming, ‘novel’ forms of persecution, access to justice, and ultimately ‘new’ migrations, is intimately
connected to long-standing passive attitudes towards wider issues of neoliberal
inequality, imperialism, and wealth (re)distribution. Such attitudes depict the
lives of developing-world inhabitants—as well as their environments244—as
239 See, e.g., Nina Höing and Jona Razzaque, Unacknowledged and Unwanted? ’Environmental refugees’ in Search of Legal Status, 8 J. GLOB. ETHICS 19, 27-28 (2012); Thea Philip, Climate Change
Displacement and Migration: An Analysis of the Current International Legal Regime’s Deficiency, Proposed Solutions and a Way Forward for Australia, 19 MELB. J. INT’L. L., 639, 646 (2018).
240

See generally ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND THE LAW OF WAR: A “FIFTH GENEVA” CONVENPROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT IN TIME OF ARMED CONFLICT? (Glen Plant ed., Belhaven
1992); see also MÉLANIE JACQUES, ARMED CONFLICT AND DISPLACEMENT: THE PROTECTION OF REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (2012).
TION ON THE

241 JANE MCADAM, CLIMATE CHANGE, FORCED MIGRATION, & INTERNATIONAL LAW 210-211 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2012).
242 See e.g., Aurelie Lopez, The Protection of Environmentally-Displaced Persons in International
Law, 37 ENVTL. L. 365, 374, 384-385 (2007).
243

Global Governance Monitor, The Global Human Rights Regime, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELA(May 11, 2012), https://www.cfr.org/report/global-human-rights-regime. For a reasoned explanation of the structure underlying the dictum, see Obiora Chinedu Okafor (U.N. Hum. Rts. Council
Independent Expert on Human Rights and International Solidarity), Rep. on International Solidarity and
Climate Change, A/HRC/44/44, ¶ 36 (April 1, 2020).

TIONS,

244 For indigenous people, devaluing the environment is akin to devaluing the person, see Osofsky,
supra note 84; Lopez, supra note 242.
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worthy of less money and care than those in the central pulsing nerve of the
empire.245
The trouble with the word “poverty” is that it is a passive word, suggesting a
state of social affairs, which has to be confronted, as best they can, by state and
society, and until then to be endured by those called “poor.” The words “poverty”
and “poor” normalize what should be centrally problematic. Impoverishment is
not a natural state but a dynamic process of public decision-making in which it is
considered just, right and fair that some people may become or stay
impoverished.246
Tellingly, international arbitration “[t]ribunals have given internationalized
state[-TNC] contracts priority over domestic regulatory efforts at all levels, from
executive measures to legislation, and across the full range of regulatory contexts,” including the environment and human rights.247 The upcoming Treaty
might contribute to reversing or at least flattening the trend by providing a competing international obligation.
If business-induced ‘environmental’ migrants face a reluctant yet mounting
recognition of the second element (their being ‘environmental’) but a dismissal
of the first (business-induced), it is mainly because of the political priorities of
global governors who assume their free-market agenda to be universal (and ignore a fortiori interdependence of the two factors).248 Eloquently put, “[t]he governance debate on environmental migration has generally been conceived within
such a framework. If [. . .] universal standards are not appropriate, new universal
standards should be found.”249 Through moral lenses, corporations that not only
exploited the environment but also engaged in targeted misinformation and lob-

245 In economic terms, see Jack Landman Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, Lex Loci Delictus and Global
Economic Welfare: Spinozzi v. ITT Sheraton Corp. 120 HARV. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (2007) (“[o]ptimal
labor and environmental standards depend on a range of factors including tastes, incomes, and access to
technology. Because these factors differ across nations (and especially between developed and developing nations), there is no reason to think that standards should be the same everywhere. [. . . To exemplify,
t]he amount of damages payable for a typical injury or fatality in lower-income countries will be lower
because [. . .] the value of life and limb is lower in such countries”). For a slightly more nuanced version
posited that still mimics the same elitist rationales and hierarchical value system by other Euro-American
scholars, see Daniel M. Weinstock, (How) Do We Need to Change Political Philosophy to Take Risk into
Account?, in HUMANITY AT RISK: THE NEED FOR GLOBAL GOVERNANCE 53, 61 (Daniel Innerarity &
Francisco Javier Solana de Madariaga eds., 2013) (“ordinary citizens simply lack the cognitive sophistication to deal with complex risks[; . . .] if they are given too much of a decision-making role, they will
tend to make costly mistakes, by succumbing to heuristics rather than engaging in [. . .] sober, costbenefit analysis [. . . T]he complexity inherent in modern-day risks requires [. . .] affording more discretion to experts who, having identified the errors in reasoning to which common folk are prone, can better
resist those errors. They will then reach decisions in the cold light of facts and probabilities rather than in
the heat produced by fear and collective dysfunctions of reasoning.”).
246

Upendra Baxi, LAW

247

Julian Arato, Corporations as Lawmakers, 56 HARV. INT’L. L.J. 229, 233 (2015).

AND

POVERTY: CRITICAL ESSAYS 6 (Tripathi 1988) (emphasis added).

248 See Maxine A. Burkett, Behind the Veil: Climate Migration, Regime Shift, and a New Theory of
Justice, 53 HARV. CIV. RTS. - CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 445, 456-460 (2018).
249 Benoı̂t Mayer, Environmental Migration in the Asia-Pacific Region: Could We Hang Out Sometime?, 3 ASIAN J. INT’L. L. 101, 114 (2013).
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bying campaigns aimed at downplaying their willfully (or at least knowingly)
harmful impact, should bear their portion of the blame.250
In conclusion, will the hopefully but implausibly universal Treaty under scrutiny be able to substantially improve access to justice mechanisms for migrants
whose territory and environment has been irredeemably devastated by reckless
business actions? The Treaty is ground-breaking in adjudicative and even prescriptive jurisdictional terms, which remains highly relevant as civil litigation
around ‘climate refugee’ matters is set to intensify in the coming years,251 and
the idea of universal jurisdiction over TNCs’ crimes betrays perhaps an overabundance of optimism.252 Thus the new Treaty’s overambitious scope covering
“all human rights [. . .] in accordance with domestic and international law”253
might risk not resolving the longstanding issue of how to identify the cases where
corporate acts were the primary instigators of a migration rather than ‘just’ one
tangible auxiliary cause.254

250 Säde M. Hormio Can Corporations Have (Moral) Responsibility Regarding Climate Change Mitigation?, 20 ETHICS, POL’Y & ENV’T 314 (2017).
251 U.N. Environment Programme, The Status of Climate Change Litigation: A Global Review, DEL/
2110/NA, 25 (May 2017).
252 Contra Marie Davoise, All Roads Lead to Rome: Strengthening Domestic Prosecutions of Businesses through the Inclusion of Corporate Liability in the Rome Statute, OPINIO JURIS (Jul. 17, 2019)
http://opiniojuris.org/2019/07/25/all-roads-lead-to-rome-strengthening-domestic-prosecutions-of-businesses-through-the-inclusion-of-corporate-liability-in-the-rome-statute/; Cedric Ryngaert, Accountability
for Corporate Human Rights Abuses: Lessons from the Possible Exercise of Dutch National Criminal
Jurisdiction Over Multinational Corporations, 29 CRIM. L. F. 1, 18-20 (2018); Kendra Magraw, Universally Liable – Corporate-Complicity Liability Under the Principle of Universal Jurisdiction, 18 MINN. J.
INT’L. L. 458 (2009).
253 Third Revised Draft, supra note 19, at art. 5(3).
254 Next steps towards Treaty adoption are being taken in the aftermath of the Sixth and Seventh
Sessions which were convened in Geneva in October 2020 and October 2021 respectively, and that were
preceded by the third and fourth full drafts of the instrument mentioned supra. After the Sixth Session in
October 2020, the Chair-Rapporteur urged States and other non-State stakeholders to submit their desired
textual integrations and amendments on the Third Revised Draft by the end of March 2021, so that the
release of a fourth version may be in review by Fall 2021. It is now a matter of determining negotiating
rounds of this project de lege ferenda to be signed into binding law.
For information on the Sixth Session, see U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. on the Sixth Session of the
Open-Ended Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Respect to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/46/73 (Jan. 14, 2021) (https://undocs.org/A/
HRC/46/73) (hereinafter Sixth Session Rep.); Annex to the Sixth Session Rep. (of Compilation of Oral
Statements) U.N. Doc. A/HRC/46/73, https://www.ohchr.org/Documents/HRBodies/HRCouncil/WG
TransCorp/Session6/igwg-6th-statement-compilation-annex.pdf; for general information on the Sixth
Session, see https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Session6/Pages/Session6.aspx.
For information on the Fifth Session, see U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Rep. on the Fifth Session of the OpenEnded Intergovernmental Working Group on Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises
with Respect to Human Rights, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/43/55 (Jan. 9, 2020), https://undocs.org/A/HRC/43/
55; for general information on the Fifth Session, see https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Session5/Pages/Session5.aspx. For a succinct scholarly commentary on the latter, see Claire
Methven O’Brien, Confronting the Constraints of the Medium: The Fifth Session of the UN Intergovernmental Working Group on a Business and Human Rights Treaty, 5 BUS. & HUM. RTS. J. 150 (2020). To
explore topics from the Seventh Session, see U.N. Hum. Rts. Council, Report from Seventh Session,
provisional Agenda, https://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/WGTransCorp/Session7/Pages/Session7.aspx (last accessed Dec. 16, 2021).
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